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FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, FEDERAL UNIONS, AND FEDERAL
COURTS: THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR
STEPHEN L. WOOD*
INTRODUCTION
The Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA or the Act) governs labor/
management relations in the federal sector.' Passed in 1978, the Act was
called the "most comprehensive reform of the Federal work force since
passage of the Pendleton Act 2 in 1883." 3 The Act replaced a series of
Executive Orders which regulated labor/management relations in the
federal sector during the 1960s and 1970s.4 Among other innovations,
the Act created the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA or the
Authority) which Congress empowered to adjudicate unfair labor prac-
tice5 complaints in the federal sector.6
One issue that has remained unclear under the Civil Service Reform
Act is the role that the duty of fair representation7 plays in the federal
* The author wishes to express his thanks to Professor Martin Malin for his assistance and
guidance during the progress of this Note.
1. Specifically, Title VII of the CSRA, also called the Federal Service Labor-Management
Relations Statute, governs labor/management relations in the Federal sector. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-
35 (1982).
2. Ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883). For a discussion of the social and political climate that existed
at the time Congress passed the Pendleton Act, see Developments in the Law - Public Employment,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1619-29 (1984) [hereinafter Developments].
3. S. REP. No. 95-969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., and H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-1717, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2723, 2723 [hereinafter Legislative
History].
4. Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2725-26. See also Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R.
130 (1962) (revoked 1969); Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 510 (1969) as amended by Exec. Order
No. 11,616, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1971); Exec. Order No. 11,636, 36 Fed. Reg. 24901 (1971); Exec. Order
No. 11,838, 40 Fed. Reg. 5743 (1975); Exec. Order No. 11,901, 41 Fed. Reg. 4807 (1976); Exec.
Order No. 12,027, 42 Fed. Reg. 61851 (1977); Exec. Order No. 12,107, 44 Fed. Regs. 1055 (1978).
5. A labor practice is "unfair" if the FLRA determines that it violates any of the provisions of
the statutory code of conduct set out in Title VII. See 5 U.S.C. § 7116 (listing specific unfair labor
practices). For a discussion of unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act, see A.
Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 105-12 (9th ed. 1981).
6. Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2822.
7. The duty of fair representation is a judicially created duty that courts have imposed on
labor organizations to ensure that they treat all members within the bargaining unit fairly and with-
out discrimination. See infra notes 14 to 23 and accompanying text. Employees in the private sector
may enforce the duty of fair representation directly in state or federal courts if their unions breach
the duty. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
A union's duty of fair representation extends both to its negotiation of a non-discriminatory
collective bargaining agreement and to its non-discriminatory administration of the agreement. As
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
employment sector. In the private sector, the courts imposed the duty of
fair representation on unions to ensure that they treated all of their mem-
bers fairly and without discrimination. Four years after Congress passed
the Civil Service Reform Act, a federal employee brought suit directly in
federal district court alleging that his union breached its duty to repre-
sent him fairly when it administered the collective bargaining agree-
ment.8 The suit raised troublesome issues of subject matter jurisdiction,
preemption and statutory interpretation; it was the first in a series of
cases that has created a split in the courts over the question whether a
federal employee may seek a remedy for breach of fair representation in
federal court or whether the employee's sole remedy is to file an unfair
labor practice complaint before the Federal Labor Relations Authority.9
This Note investigates the split in the courts over the question
whether jurisdiction exists in federal courts to hear federal employees'
fair representation claims. Part I reviews the history of the duty of fair
representation in the private sector.10 Part II discusses the history of the
Civil Service Reform Act of 197811 and Part III reviews the conflicting
fair representation decisions under the Act.12 Courts that address the
jurisdictional problems inherent in a federal fair representation suit per-
form several types of analyses and these will be outlined and discussed.
In Part IV, the Note analyzes the arguments for and against judicial rec-
noted, infra at text accompanying notes 18 to 23, early private sector duty of fair representation
cases involved alleged breaches in the negotiation of discriminatory collective bargaining agree-
ments. In these early cases, white-dominated unions were accused of negotiating collective bargain-
ing agreements with the employer that discriminated against blacks in a bargaining unit. Most
modem fair representation cases, however, involve alleged union breaches in the administration of
the bargaining agreement. For example, a bargaining unit member might allege that the union failed
to file her grievance within the limitations period because she had been critical of union officials at a
recent meeting. Since all of the federal sector fair representation cases discussed in this Note involve
contract administration claims, rather than contract negotiation claims, the scope of this Note will be
limited to the duty of fair representation in the administration of a collective bargaining agreement.
8. Karahalios v. Defense Language Inst., 534 F. Supp. 1202 (N.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 821 F.2d
1389 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2032 (1988). See discussion infra notes 161 to 178 and
accompanying text.
9. Of the various district court decisions that address the federal fair representation issue, the
United States Courts of Appeals have reviewed four. Two appellate decisions have upheld jurisdic-
tion over the federal employee's suit in district court for breach of the duty of fair representation.
Naylor v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 446, 580 F. Supp. 137 (W.D.N.C. 1983), aff'd
without written opinion, 727 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 850 (1984); Pham v. Ameri-
can Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 916, 799 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1986). Two other appellate
decisions, however, have denied the right to bring federal fair representation suits in district court
and have held that a federal employee's exclusive remedy is before the Federal Labor Relations
Authority. Warren v. Local 1759, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 764 F.2d 1395 (1 lth Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985); Karahalios v. Defense Language Inst., 821 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2032 (1988).
10. See infra notes 14 to 76 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 77 to 141 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 142 to 252 and accompanying text.
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ognition of a federal sector duty of fair representation. ' 3 It becomes clear
that the courts' efforts to distinguish the private sector fair representation
models are ultimately unsuccessful. The Note concludes that federal
courts should enforce a federal duty of fair representation because the
private sector models are analogous to the federal sector model, and the
rationales for providing fair representation suits to aggrieved private sec-
tor employees are equally applicable to federal sector employees.
I. FAIR REPRESENTATION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
A. Origins of the Duty
The Supreme Court has defined a union's duty of fair representation
as the "statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without
hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with
complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct."' 4 The
Court imposed the duty of fair representation on unions -which were
elected exclusive representatives of the bargaining unit because the labor
statutes gave unions the power to act on behalf of all the unit's employ-
ees; therefore, according to the Court, unions should be required to do so
in good faith.' 5 Thus, the duty arose from the exclusivity concept em-
bedded in both the National Labor Relations Act' 6 and the Railway La-
bor Act. ' 7
The line of cases establishing the duty of fair representation in the
private sector reaches back to the 1940s and deals primarily with the
union's alleged breach of fair representation in the negotiation of a ra-
cially discriminatory collective bargaining agreement with the em-
ployer.' 8 For example, in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad,19
where the Supreme Court first recognized a duty of fair representation
under the Railway Labor Act, a group of black trainmen whom the
union had excluded from membership brought suit against the union af-
ter it negotiated a discriminatory collective bargaining agreement. 20 Af-
13. See infra notes 253 to 359 and accompanying text.
14. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
15. See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1286 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983 & supp. 1987).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
17. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982).
18. See generally Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Graham v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. How-
ard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
19. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
20. Id. at 194-96. The contract provided, inter alia, that not more than 50% of the train fire-
men in each district could be black; that vacancies and new jobs had to be filled by whites until this
50% quota was met; and that no blacks could be hired into seniority positions. Id. at 195. Although
the black employees were not actually members of the union (because the white majority excluded
19881
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ter the trial court dismissed the case, the employees appealed to the
Alabama Supreme Court which held,' on the merits, that there was no
statutory provision in the Railway Labor Act that imposed a duty of fair
representation on unions. 21 The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the statute imposed a duty of fair representation on the
union because the statute gave the union exclusive bargaining power.22
Because the statute deprived the minority union members of the right to
choose their own representative or to bargain individually with the em-
ployer, the Court held that the union elected by the majority of members
in a bargaining unit owed a duty to represent minority members fairly.23
B. Jurisdictional Foundations
The early fair representation cases dealt with situations in which
employees alleged that their union negotiated a discriminatory collective
bargaining contract. The focus has shifted, however, to employee allega-
tions that their union administered the existing contract provisions in
bad faith or discriminatorily. 24 In cases involving the union's alleged dis-
criminatory administration of the collective bargaining agreement, the
fair representation suit (known as a "hybrid") involves both a claim
against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation and a claim
against the employer for breach of the collective bargaining contract.25
them), the black employees were subject to the collective bargaining agreement because the majority
of the bargaining unit had elected the union their exclusive representative. Id. at 194-95.
21. Id. at 194, 197-98.
22. Id. at 202-03.
23. Id. The Court concluded that "[in the absence of any available administrative remedy, the
right here asserted... is ofjudicial cognizance." Id. at 207. Justice Murphy, concurring, wrote that
the Court decided the case on "legal niceties, while remaining mute and placid as to the obvious and
oppressive deprivation of constitutional guarantees, [making] the judicial function something less
than it should be." Id. at 208.
While the Supreme Court has often indicated that the duty of fair representation extends be-
yond a duty to refrain from racial discrimination, the Court has not itself extended the substantive
duty beyond such cases. "[Alpart from establishing racial discrimination as a clear breach of duty
and recognizing that unions must be afforded sufficient latitude to carry out their collective bargain-
ing functions, the Court [has] not yet developed a general standard of union conduct." M. MALIN,
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE UNION 352-53 (1988). Lower courts, however, have expanded
the duty to encompass a variety of situations. Id. at 357; see, e.g., Ferro v. Railway Express Agency,
296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961) (political considerations may breach the duty of fair representation);
Mount v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 226 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1955) (political considera-
tions); Truck Drivers, Local Union 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (discrimination
against member of smaller union); NLRB v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. Lodge 727, 279
F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1960) (discrimination against another union).
24. See M. MALIN, supra note 23, at 381.
25. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 59 (1981); M. MALIN, supra note 23,
at 423; 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 15, at 1292-93.
A typical scenario would be as follows: The union and employer enter into a collective bargain-
ing agreement which provides that the employer will only discharge employees for just cause. The
employer later discharges an employee for unjust cause and she asks her union to file a grievance on
[Vol. 64:271
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Establishing jurisdiction over the breach of contract component of
the hybrid suit was problematic for employees covered by the Railway
Labor Act. That statute specifically vests exclusive jurisdiction in the
National Railway Adjustment Board (NRAB) to resolve breach of con-
tract claims against an employer. 26 Yet, when confronted with the argu-
ment that the Railway Labor Act preempted district court jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court held that federal courts exercised federal question
jurisdiction over breach of fair representation claims employees brought
under this Act.27 Thus, despite the explicit Railway Labor Act provi-
sion, the Supreme Court has made it clear that federal courts may exer-
cise federal question jurisdiction over both the fair representation claim
against the union and the breach of contract claim against the employer
in fair representation suits brought under the Railway Labor Act. 28
In 1957, the Supreme Court extended the duty of fair representation
in Syres v. Oil Workers International Union, Local No. 23 29 to employees
her behalf. The union refuses to file the grievance and breaches its duty of fair representation if the
refusal was in bad faith. The employee will then bring an action against the union for breach of the
duty of fair representation and againt the employer for the underlying breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.
26. See 45 U.S.C. § 153 First(i).
27. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1957) (Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district
courts exercise "original jurisdiction [over] all civil actions arising under the . . . laws . . .of the
United States."). The Supreme Court has reaffirmed its earlier holding and reiterated its view that
federal courts exercise jurisdiction over fair representation claims brought by employees subject to
the Railway Labor Act. Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 328-29 (1969). See also Czosek
v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1970).
28. M. MALIN, supra note 23, at 426, notes that Glover created a narrow exception to the rule
that the National Railway Adjustment Board had exclusive jurisdiction over breach of contract
claims against employers.
Two recent decisions have discussed the propriety of this judicial exception to NRAB exclusiv-
ity. In Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway, 697 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1983), the court raised sua
sponte the question of proper subject matter jurisdiction over a hybrid fair representation suit under
the Railway Labor Act. While the employee's breach of duty claim "arose under" the RLA for
purposes of federal question jurisdiction, the breach of contract claim, according to the court, did
not so arise and no statute gave the court jurisdiction over the claim. Id. at 774-75. The court
concluded, however, that the breach of contract claim arose under federal common law and the
court thereby exercised jurisdiction over it. Id. at 776.
The case of Kaschak v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 707 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1983), also involved a
railway employee who filed a hybrid fair representation claim. The court held that the Railway
Labor Act was "quasi-contractual" in nature and thus created "legally enforceable obligations en-
forceable by whatever means appropriate." Id. at 909 n.13. A different result, according to the
court, would render the railway employees' rights illusory. Id. at 909. "[Flailure to afford the em-
ployee a judicial remedy is tantamount to a denial of the right to be a party to a legally enforceable
collective bargaining agreement. We cannot countenance such a result." Id. at 910. One commen-
tator has suggested that, for purposes of proper subject matter jurisdiction analysis, the approach
taken by the Kaschak court is preferable to that taken by the Grafcourt. See Hirshman, Whose Law
Is It, Anyway? A Reconsideration of Federal Question Jurisdiction Over Cases of Mixed State and
Federal Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17, 69-72 (1984).
29. 350 U.S. 892 (1957). In Syres, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the employee's fair representation claim on the ground that
the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the suit. Syres, 223 F.2d 739, 743 (5th Cir.
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covered by the National Labor Relations Act. In a one-paragraph per
curiam opinion, the Court remanded the fair representation case to the
district court, citing its previous fair representation decisions under the
Railway Labor Act to support its order. In doing so, the Court implic-
itly concluded that federal courts exercised jurisdiction over fair repre-
sentation claims under the National Labor Relations Act, 30 and that they
exercised such jurisdiction for the same reasons the Supreme Court relied
on in its Railway Labor Act decisions.
As the case law developed, however, it became clear that the juris-
dictional foundations for hybrid suits under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act differed from those under the Railway Labor Act. Unlike the
Railway Labor Act, section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
amended the National Labor Relations Act to enable federal district
courts to exercise jurisdiction over breach of collective bargaining agree-
ment claims.31 Under the Railway Labor Act, both the fair representa-
tion claim and the breach of contract claim are founded on federal
question jurisdiction because no other jurisdictional foundation is avail-
able. 32 In contrast, under the National Labor Relations Act, the em-
ployee's claim against her union is founded on federal question
jurisdiction, but the employee's breach of contract claim against her em-
ployer is founded on section 301. 33
In 1962, the National Labor Relations Board decided the case of
Miranda Fuel Co. 34 and recognized the breach of fair representation as
1955). The Fifth Circuit reasoned that it could exercise neither diversity jurisdiction nor federal
question jurisdiction over the claims. The Supreme Court disagreed. In its summary reversal, the
Supreme Court cited its previous fair representation decisions under the Railway Labor Act and
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.
30. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 15, at 1288.
31. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), provides in perti-
nent part: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . or
between . . . labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties."
Before Congress amended the NLRA, state courts exercised jurisdiction over suits for breach of
the collective bargaining agreement. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 5, at 553. Unless
the parties were diverse in citizenship, they were confined to the state courts. The state courts
proved to be inadequate forums for developing a consistent national labor policy. Id. at 553-54.
After Congress passed § 301, the parties had access to the unifying force of the federal courts. In
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957), the Supreme Court held that
Congress intended federal courts "to fashion federal law" in the area of labor-management relations
within the ambit of § 301.
32. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 15, at 1292-93.
33. See Justice Stewart's concurrence in United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 66
(1981) ("The contract claim against the employer is based on § 301, but the duty of fair representa-
tion claim is derived from the NLRA.").
34. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enf't denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
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an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act.35 After
the Board recognized fair representation claims as actionable unfair labor
practices under its jurisdiction, both the courts and the Board were exer-
cising jurisdiction over fair representation claims. The question soon
arose whether the Board should exercise exclusive jurisdiction over fair
representation claims in order to avoid potentially conflicting administra-
tive and judicial decisions. The seminal United States Supreme Court
case in the area of private sector duty of fair representation cases, Vaca v.
Sipes,36 held that federal courts retained jurisdiction over fair representa-
tion suits and were not preempted by the Board's recognition of these
claims.
In Vaca v. Sipes, an employee brought suit in state court for breach
of the duty of fair representation, alleging that his union arbitrarily re-
fused to take his grievance to arbitration.37 The union had initially
agreed to process the employee's grievance, but later determined that
pursuing the grievance to arbitration would be fruitless. 38 The employee
then brought suit, claiming the union had breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation when it refused to arbitrate his grievance. 39 The jury found in
favor of the employee, 4° but the state trial court set aside the verdict on
the ground that the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive juris-
diction over the dispute.41 The state court of appeals affirmed, but the
state supreme court reversed and reinstated the jury award.42
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
whether the Board's recognition in Miranda Fuel that fair representation
claims were unfair labor practices preempted state and federal court sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.43 The Court noted that under the preemption
doctrine, 44 courts were prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over a
35. Two Board members dissented on the ground that "[t]he courts have furnished, and do
furnish, a remedy." Id. at 202.
36. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
37. Id. at 173. The employee had been hospitalized for high blood pressure and, after his recov-
ery, his family doctor approved the employee's request to return to work. Id at 174. The company
doctor, however, conducted his own examination and concluded that the employee was not fit to
work. Eventually the company discharged the employee for poor health. Id. at 175.
38. Id. The union paid for its own medical examination of the employee which did not support
the employee's position. At an executive board meeting, the union decided that it would not pursue
the grievance to arbitration and suggested that the employee accept the company's settlement offer
which included the employee's referral to a rehabilitation center. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 173. The jury awarded the employee $7,000 in compensatory damages, and $3,300 in
punitive damages.
41. Id. at 173-74.
42. Id. at 174.
43. Id. at 174, 176-78.
44. The Supreme Court held in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
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substantial body of labor law suits thought to involve questions within
the particular expertise of the National Labor Relations Board.45 The
Court distinguished fair representation cases and declined to hold that
the claims were preempted. 46
First, the Court observed that the federal courts originally devel-
oped the fair representation doctrine, and that when the Board decided
to recognize the duty in Miranda Fuel, the Board "adopted and applied
the doctrine as it had been developed by the federal courts."' 47 Thus, the
Board could not argue, at least not from a historical perspective, that it
had expertise over fair representation issues. Second, the Supreme Court
stated that fair representation suits often involved matters that were not
within the Board's unfair labor practice jurisdiction, thus casting doubt
on the argument that the administrative agency's expertise controlled the
issue.48 Third, the Court noted the unique role that fair representation
suits played in the collective bargaining system, and reasoned that since
the system "subordinates the interests of an individual employee to the
collective interests of all employees," fair representation suits were
needed to serve as a "bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against
individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of
the federal labor law."' 49 If courts were foreclosed from hearing such
cases, the Court stated, an individual employee would "no longer be as-
sured of impartial review of his complaint, since the Board's General
Counsel has unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor
245 (1959), that "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the States as
well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations
Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted."
45. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 179. A primary justification for the preemption doctrine, according to
the Court, was the need to avoid conflicting rules between the administrative body empowered to
regulate the subject matter and the state or federal courts.
46. Id. The Court noted that the Garmon preemption rule did not preclude suits brought under
§§ 301 or 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, or § 701 of the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act. Id. at 179-80. Also, the Court had recognized exceptions to preemption
where the activity was either peripheral to the LMRA or touched on local interests to such a degree
that no inference could be made that Congress intended to deprive the courts of the cause of action.
Id. at 180.
47. Id. at 181.
48. Id. The Court stated that duty of fair representation suits "often require review of the
substantive positions taken and policies pursued by a union in its negotiation of a collective bargain-
ing agreement." Id. This type of review, according to the Court, was not within the administrative
expertise of the Board.
49. Id. at 182.
This Court recognized in Steele that the congressional grant of power to a union to act as
exclusive collective bargaining representative, with its corresponding reduction in the indi-
vidual rights of the employees so represented, would raise grave constitutional problems if
unions were free to exercise this power to further racial discrimination.
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practice complaint." 50 Even a small number of cases in which the Board
was unwilling to issue complaints would, according to the Court, frus-
trate the purpose of the fair representation doctrine.51
The Vaca court also cited practical considerations that foreclosed
preemption of the employee's fair representation claim.52 These consid-
erations grew out of the relationship between the duty of fair representa-
tion and enforcement of the collective bargaining contract. Section 301
allowed employees to enforce provisions of the collective bargaining con-
tract against the employer in court. 53 It was irrelevant, according to the
Court, that the employer's actions that gave rise to the breach of contract
claim could also be characterized as unfair labor practices under the
NLRB's jurisdiction.54 The Court stated that
the jurisdiction of the courts is no more destroyed by the fact that the
employee, as part and parcel of his § 301 action, finds it necessary to
prove an unfair labor practice by the union, than it is by the fact that
the suit may involve an unfair labor practice by the employer
himself.5 5
Because the hybrid suit required the Court to adjudicate the extent of
liability (and damages) of each party, the Court exercised jurisdiction
over both the union and the employer. 56 Thus, in Vaca v. Sipes, the
United States Supreme Court confirmed that concurrent jurisdiction over
fair representation suits would exist between the courts and the National
Labor Relations Board. 57
50. Id.
51. Id. at 182-83.
52. See id. at 183-88.
53. Id. at 183.
54. Id. at 183-84.
55. Id. at 186.
56. Id. at 187. According to the Court, Board remedies would be inadequate in many instances
and the adjudication of breach of contract claims was "a task which Congress has not assigned to
[the Board]." Id.
Justice Fortas, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Harlan, concurred in result but main-
tained that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction over the employee's unfair labor practice charge.
Id. at 198. They found ample justification for applying the preemption doctrine to the case because
of the expertise of the NLRB in handling issues which are "fundamental to the design and operation
of federal labor law." Id. at 199.
Justice Black dissented on the ground that, under the guise of giving an employee a right to sue
her union for breach of fair representation, the Court gave employers a powerful new defense to the
employee's § 301 suit for breach of contract. Id. at 210.
[T]oday's decision, requiring the individual employee to take on both the employer and the
union in every suit against the employer and to prove not only that the employer breached
its contract, but that the union acted arbitrarily, converts what would otherwise be a sim-
ple breach-of-contract action into a three-ring donnybrook.
Id.
57. The Supreme Court went on to hold in Vaca v. Sipes that the employee did not prove that
the union breached its duty of fair representation when it refused to take the employee's grievance to
arbitration. Id. at 189. The Court held that there was no absolute right to arbitration, and that a
1988]
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C. Developing a Standard of Conduct
While the Supreme Court's decision in Vaca settled the preemption
question, it did not clearly define what standard the lower courts should
apply in these cases. The Court stated in Vaca that "[a] breach of the
statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct
toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discrimi-
natory, or in bad faith." 58 The Court also stated in dicta, however, that
the union "might well have breached its duty ... had it processed the
grievance in a perfunctory manner." 59 Thus, the Court mentioned at
least four possible standards that courts could apply in fair representa-
tion suits. The Court's nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory, good faith,
nonperfunctory standards obviously left much room for interpretation.
Besides defining what type of behavior could be classified as perfunctory
or arbitrary, courts had to determine whether the union had to breach all
four Vaca standards to be held liable, or whether they could, for exam-
ple, be liable if they acted "arbitrarily" but not with "discriminatory pur-
pose" or in "bad faith." In the twenty-one years since the Vaca decision,
the Supreme Court has not addressed the wide split in the lower courts
on the issue of which standards to apply to union conduct.6°
On one extreme, the Seventh Circuit requires a finding of "inten-
tional misconduct" before liability will attach in a private sector fair rep-
resentation suit.61  Occupying a middle ground is the standard that
imposes liability on the union unless it can provide a "rational explana-
tion" for its conduct. 62 On the other extreme, simple union negligence
breach of the duty of fair representation occurred only when the union's conduct was "arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith." Id. at 190. In the case at bar, the union processed the employee's
grievance into the fourth step and then discovered, in an attempt to gather further medical evidence,
that proceeding to arbitration would be fruitless. Id. at 194. The Court concluded that because
there was no evidence that the union had acted in bad faith, the union did not breach its duty of fair
representation. Id. at 194-95.
The Court continued its analysis and discussed appropriate remedies. Id. at 195-97. The guid-
ing principle, according to the Court, was fairly to apportion damages between the employer and the
union: "[D]amages attributable solely to the employer's breach of contract should not be charged to
the union, but increases if any in those damages caused by the union's refusal to process the griev-
ance should not be charged to the employer." Id. at 197-98.
58. Id. at 190. The Court thereby rejected the Missouri Supreme Court's strict liability stan-
dard. See M. MALIN, supra note 23, at 355.
59. 386 U.S. at 194.
60. See generally M. MALIN, supra note 23, at 357-71.
61. See Hoffman v- Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981); Grant v. Burlington Indus., 832
F.2d 76, 79 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that the court had "repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to the
Hoffman 'intentional misconduct' standard").
62. See, e.g., Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 707 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 982 (1983).
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has been held to breach the duty of fair representation. 63
D. Apportionment of Damages
Once liability is established in the hybrid fair representation suit, the
court must determine whether and how much the union, the employer,
or both should be assessed damages for their breaches. Depending on
whether the suit is brought under the Railway Labor Act or the National
Labor Relations Act, courts will apportion different damages to the
union and the employer because of the different duties the statutes im-
pose on the parties. For federal unions and agencies under the Civil Ser-
vice Reform Act, analogy to one statute or the other could have
significant financial consequences.
The Supreme Court has not definitively determined the proper ap-
portionment of damages in fair representation cases brought under the
Railway Labor Act. A union's discriminatory refusal to file a grievance
on the employee's behalf, for example, would have less consequence
under the Railway Labor Act since the Act permits employees to pursue
their own grievances before the NRAB. By contrast, under the National
Labor Relations Act, employees normally rely on their unions to process
their grievances.
The degree of union control over the grievance process was noted in
the Supreme Court's decision in Czosek v. O'Mara,64 a fair representation
case brought under the Railway Labor Act.65 The Court held that
"damages against the union for loss of employment are unrecoverable
except to the extent that its refusal to handle the grievances added to the
difficulty and expense of collecting from the employer."' 66 The Court rea-
soned that since the Railway Labor Act permits railway employees to
pursue their own grievances, the union's discriminatory refusal to pro-
cess the grievance would add only slightly to the difficulty and expense of
63. Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1983).
64. 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
65. Id. at 29. In Czosek, the district court dismissed the railway employees' hybrid fair repre-
sentation suit against both the union and the employer. The employees claimed the employer wrong-
fully discharged them in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Railway Labor Act and the
collective bargaining contract, and that the union breached its duty of fair representation. Id. at 26.
The district court dismissed the claim against the employer for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies under the Railway Labor Act and for lack of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 27. The district
court dismissed the claim against the union for failure adequately to allege a breach of duty and
because the employees could have processed their own grievances. Id. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reinstated the claim against the union. Id. The Second Circuit
granted the employees leave to amend their complaint against the employer if 'here was reason to
believe the employer was implicated in the union's discrimination against the employees. Id.
66. Id. at 29. The Court stated that the union could only be assessed those damages that flowed
from its own conduct. Id.
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collecting from the employer. 67 Thus, under the Court's "added ex-
pense" formula, unions governed by the Railway Labor Act would gen-
erally be found liable only for a small portion of a fair representation
damage award while employers would bear the majority of the award.
In contrast, the Supreme Court analyzed damages apportionment
under the National Labor Relations Act in Bowen v. United States Postal
Service 68 and arrived at a different apportionment formula. 69 The Court
stated that the paramount concern in apportioning damages was making
an employee whole once fault had been established against both the
union and the employer.70 The Court held that, just as the employer was
responsible for damages caused by the wrongful discharge, the union was
responsible for the increase in damages it caused by breaching its duty of
fair representation. 71 In relieving the employer of some liability, the
Court observed that unions play a pivotal role in processing grievances
under the National Labor Relations Act 72 and that an employer should
be able to rely on the union's assessment and waiver of the employee's
claim without fear of suit.73
The union in Bowen urged the Court to apply the "added expense"
67. Id.
68. 459 U.S. 212 (1983).
69. The district court judge in Bowen had essentially left the apportionment of damages to the
jury; it came back with an award approximately evenly divided between the union and the employer.
Id. at 217. The district court judge instructed the jury that it could divide the damages between the
union and the employer based on the estimated date the union would have taken the employee's
grievance to arbitration and gotten the employee reinstated. Id. at 215. Under the district court's
instructions, the employer would be liable for damages from the time the employer discharged the
employee until the time the hypothetical arbitrator would have ordered reinstatement had the union
arbitrated, and the union would be liable for any damages after the hypothetical arbitration date. Id.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the damages award against the union, holding that the employer
was solely responsible for back pay damages, and that the union could not be held liable for any of
the award. Id. at 217. The court of appeals agreed that both parties were at fault and had acted
recklessly, but that back pay awards could only be assessed against the employer. Id.
70. Id. at 222. The Court observed that, just as it would be unfair to hold the union liable for
damages the employer caused, it would be equally unfair to hold the employer liable for that increase
in the damages caused by the union's wrongful conduct. Id. at 223.
71. Id.
72. The Court noted that the National Labor Relations Act provided, at § 9(a), that an em-
ployee may present grievances to her employer without the union's intervention, provided that the
adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining contract. Id. at 225 n. 14.
The Court pointed out, however, that most collective bargaining agreements under the NLRA con-
tained grievance and arbitration provisions which the union supervised exclusively. Id. "When the
collective-bargaining agreement provides the union with sole authority to press an employee's griev-
ance, the union acts as the employee's exclusive representative in the grievance-arbitration proce-
dure." Id.
73. Id. at 226. The Court reasoned that since an unorganized employer could treat an em-
ployee's failure to challenge her discharge as a waiver of that challenge, an organized employer
should be able to treat the union's failure to challenge an employee's discharge as a waiver of that
challenge. Id. The Court also noted that if the union was not liable for a portion of the damages, it
would have no incentive to comply with its duty of fair representation. Id. at 227.
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formula established in Czosek instead of apportioning damages against
it,74 but the Court distinguished Czosek on the ground that the Railway
Labor Act provided the employees with an alternative remedy. The
union's breach in Czosek did not deprive the employees of a remedy, the
Court stated, it simply increased the expenses the employees incurred in
vindicating their rights.75 Because the employees in Bowen did not have
an alternative remedy, damages against the union, including back pay
from the date the union should have taken the case to arbitration, were
appropriate. 76 Thus, the Court established that the "added expense"
formula was applicable only under a statutory scheme that permitted em-
ployees to pursue their own grievances.
As this review of private sector fair representation case law reflects,
the federal courts originated, developed and refined the private sector
duty of fair representation under both the National Labor Relations Act
and the Railway Labor Act. While the proper standard courts should
apply to union conduct is not settled, the jurisdictional foundations of
the fair representation suit have been well established. The two-claim
hybrid suit under the RLA rests entirely on federal question jurisdiction,
while the two-claim hybrid suit under the NLRA rests both on federal
question and section 301 jurisdiction. When Congress passed the Civil
Service Reform Act in 1978 in an attempt to update and reform the fed-
eral employment sector, federal courts had been adjudicating private sec-
tor fair representation suits for over thirty years.
II. THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT
A. Origins of the Legislation
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 replaced a series of Executive
Orders that had governed federal labor relations since the 1960s.77 The
74. Id. at 228.
75. Id. at 229-30.
76. Id. The Court indicated that it did not reach the question whether the district court's jury
instructions were proper since the union only argued that back pay could not be assessed against it.
See id. at 230 n.19.
77. See supra note 4.
In 1962, President Kennedy signed the first Federal Labor Relations Executive Order, known as
Executive Order 10,988. 3 C.F.R. 130 (1962). Some of the major provisions of Executive Order
10,988 included recognition of federal employee unions, imposition of a duty to bargain in good
faith, and advisory grievance arbitration. See Cooper & Bauer, Federal Sector Labor Relations Re-
form, 56 CH.-KENT L. REV. 509, 513-15 (1980).
Criticism of Executive Order 10,988 led President Nixon to amend the order, first in 1969 with
Executive Order 11,491 and again in 1970 with Executive Orders 11,616 and 11,636. The first
Nixon amendment, Executive Order 11,491, established a Federal Labor Relations Council which
was given responsibility to administer and interpret the order, as well as to formulate policy, pre-
scribe regulations and suggest recommendations for program improvements. Id. at 515-16. Execu-
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Act incorporated many of the suggestions contained in an extensive
Carter Administration study of federal employment relations. 78  Senate
Bill 2640, the version of the Act that Congress eventually passed, 79 was
termed the "centerpiece of the President's efforts to make the Govern-
ment more efficient and accountable. '80  President Carter stated that the
goal of civil service reform was to "make Executive Branch labor rela-
tions more comparable to those of private business, while recognizing the
special requirements of the Federal government and the paramount pub-
lic interest in the effective conduct of the public business." 81
One of the major reforms the Act accomplished was replacing the
Civil Service Commission with two distinct agencies: the Office of Per-
sonnel Management (OPM) and the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB).8 2 The Civil Service Commission was originally formed by the
Pendleton Act 83 to prevent patronage hiring, but ultimately performed
tive Order 11,491 also required the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) to extend its
services to federal agency-union disputes, and, in addition, the order created the Federal Services
Impasses Panel (FSIP) to settle agency-union impasses if the FMSC mediation services were unsuc-
cessful. Id. at 516. President Nixon's second and third amendments, Executive Orders 11,616 and
11,636, included requirements that every collective bargaining contract contain a grievance proce-
dure and that both official time provisions for contract negotiations and agency dues withholding
were negotiable subjects of bargaining. Id. at 517.
In 1975, President Ford added Executive Order 11,838. This amendment allowed negotiation
over the general coverage and scope of a grievance procedure and allowed negotiation over certain
agency regulations upon a showing of compelling need. Id. at 517-18.
78. Id. at 522. President Carter's study was called the Personnel Management Project and was
completed in five months. According to Cooper and Bauer, "[tihe recommendations of the task
force on the federal labor relations system took a conservative approach to federal labor-manage-
ment relations; an approach consistent with the priorities and policies embodied in previous execu-
tive orders." Id. (citation omitted).
79. Id. While President Carter's task force was formulating its report, two bills affecting fed-
eral employment relations were introduced in the House. Id. at 523. The House Subcommittee on
Civil Service eventually combined the bills into one called the Clay-Ford bill. No further action was
taken on this version of civil service reform legislation. Id.
After President Carter submitted his proposal to both houses, the House Committee on Post
Office and Civil Service held hearings, rejected the Carter proposal and approved an entirely new
version of the bill which was quickly endorsed by union leaders. Id. at 525. However, the Senate
version of the bill, S. 2640, followed the more restrictive Carter administration model and was passed
by the Senate in August, 1978. Id. at 525-26. The Conference Committee resolved the differences in
the proposed legislation and issued its report to both Houses of Congress in early October. Id. at
526. President Carter signed the legislation on October 13, 1978 and it became effective on January
11, 1979. Id.
80. Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2724.
81. Cooper & Bauer, supra note 77, at 524. The authors state that:
[t]he reform of the Civil Service structure overshadowed labor relations reform. The chief
interests lay in policies concerning hiring, firing, and paying federal employees. The entire
... Act was passed in just one year. Few provisions dealing with labor-management rela-
tions were debated by either the House or the Senate. There is a dearth of legislative
history on the specific meaning of the labor relations provisions.
Id. at 521 (citations omitted).
82. Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2726-29.
83. Ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883). See supra note 2.
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diverse and often contradictory roles.8 4 In 1932, the Commission as-
sumed full responsibility for job classifications, employee evaluations,
and administration of the Retirement Act.85 It was at this point that the
Commission assumed the role of "management agent" for the executive
branch while ostensibly maintaining its stated mission of preventing pa-
tronage hiring practices in the federal government. The conflict of inter-
est in the two positions was one of the leading factors behind the civil
service reform movement of the 1970s. 86 The Civil Service Reform Act's
reconfiguration left the Office of Personnel Management representing the
executive duties of the original Commission,87 while the Merit Systems
Protection Board assumed responsibility for upholding the merit princi-
ples of the original Commission. 88
B. Title VII and Its Restrictions
Another important feature of the legislation was the Federal Service
Labor-Management Relations Statute (Title VII of the Civil Service Re-
form Act). The stated purpose of Title VII, found in section 7101, is to
establish procedures to meet the special requirements of labor-manage-
ment relations in the federal sector while upholding the public interest in
federal sector collective bargaining.89 To meet these goals, Congress im-
posed significant limitations on federal sector collective bargaining. 90
Under Title VII, federal labor unions have the right to bargain collec-
84. Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2727. The Commission originally provided the Execu-
tive Branch with a screening process: the Commission evaluated the applicants for job openings in
the competitive service and presented a choice to the President. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. Cf Cooper & Bauer, supra note 77, at 521. ("The impetus for reform had little to do
with the federal labor relations program. Rather, reform of the system was sparked by public opin-
ion that federal employees were underworked and overpaid.").
87. Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2727. The OPM will be an agency "within the execu-
tive branch, [with] central responsibility for executing, administering, and enforcing civil service
rules and regulations other than those under the jurisdiction of the Merit Systems Protection
Board." Id.
88. Id. at 2728. The MSPB "will assume principal responsibility for safeguarding merit princi-
ples and employee rights; individual personnel actions will be delegated to the departments and
agencies." Id. Merit protection was a principle concern of the legislators:
The complex rules and procedures have, with their resultant delays and paperwork, under-
mined confidence in the merit system. Many managers and personnel officers complain
that the existing procedures intended to assure merit and protect employees from arbitrary
actions have too often become the refuge of the incompetent employee.... [T]he system's
rigid procedures---providing almost automatic pay increases for all employees-makes it as
difficult to reward the outstanding public servant as it is to remove an incompetent
employee.
Id. at 2725.
89. 5 U.S.C § 7101. The section also provides that its "provisions ...be interpreted in a
manner consistent with the requirement of an effective and efficient Government."
90. Title VII's protections do not extend to any federal employee who is an alien, a member of
the uniformed services, a supervisor, an employee of the Foreign Service, or any person who partici-
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tively over conditions of employment (personnel policies, practices, and
other matters affecting working conditions), but are precluded from bar-
gaining over any working conditions that federal laws establish. Signifi-
cant issues such as wages, retirement benefits, and tenure are
nonnegotiable since they are established by federal statute.9'
Title VII also prohibits union shop provisions.92 Union shop provi-
sions require an employee to become a member of the union within a
specified period of time after she is hired.93 The employee is required to
pay all requisite union dues and initiation fees to support the union 94 and
thus the union avoids "free-riders" who receive the benefits of union
membership without paying any of the costs. These provisions are quite
common in the private sector and help the union both institutionalize
itself in the workplace and attain financial security. 95 Title VII does not
afford similar protections for federal union financial security. The Act
provides solely for a voluntary dues checkoff at the option of the individ-
ual employee. 96
pates in a strike. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(2). Federal employees are prohibited from striking under 5
U.S.C. § 7311.
Numerous government agencies are also excluded from Title VII's coverage. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 7103. Agencies excluded from coverage include the General Accounting Office, the FBI, the CIA,
the National Security Agency, Tennessee Valley Authority, the Federal Labor Relations Authority
and the Federal Service Impasses Panel. Explicitly included within Title VII coverage are the Veter-
ans' Administration, Library of Congress and Government Printing Office. Id.
91. See, e.g., Broida, Fair Representation for Federal Employees: An Overview, 30 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 440, 441 (1983); Cooper & Bauer, supra note 77, at 527; McCabe, Problems in Federal
Sector Labor-Management Relations under Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 33
LABOR L.J. 560, 561-62 (1982).
92. Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2831. "[Nlothing in the [collective bargaining] agree-
ment shall require membership in a labor organization or require employees to pay money to a labor
organization except pursuant to a voluntary, written authorization for the payment of dues through
payroll deductions." Id.
93. See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 15, at 1365-66.
94. The Supreme Court has held that private sector employees may choose to become only
"financial core" members and be required to pay dues to the union but refrain from becoming a full
member of the union. NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) ("[Tlhe burdens of
membership... are expressly limited to the payment of initiation fees and monthly dues."). See 2
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 15, at 1366.
As far back as 1961, the Court held that, under the Railway Labor Act, unions could not spend
"compelled" union funds on political causes with which the contributing non-members disagreed.
See International Assoc. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768-69 (1961). It was not until very
recently, however, that the Court applied a similar rule to unions governed by the National Labor
Relations Act. Communication Workers v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988). Seeing no significant
differences in the language or history of the RLA and NLRA in the context of union shop agree-
ments, the Court in Beck held that dues paid by objecting non-members could only be used for
activities related to collective bargaining, contract administration or grievance processing. Id. at
2645.
95. See generally 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 15, at 1359-95. The National
Labor Relations Act specifically allows the parties to include union shop agreements in collective
bargaining contracts. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
96. While it is clear from the legislative history that Congress intended to prohibit union shops
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Another major difference between federal sector unions and their
private sector counterparts (at least those under the NLRA) is the degree
of control each exercises over the grievance and arbitration process.
Under the NLRA, employees most often rely on the union to process any
grievances. 97 In the federal sector, however, the employee has statutory
safeguards available that, in some ways, decrease the opportunity for po-
tential union abuses. For example, if a federal employee is discharged by
a federal agency, she may appeal the agency's decision to the Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board regardless of her union's assessment of her griev-
ance or its assistance in prosecuting the appeal.98
In contrast to private sector unions, federal unions are dramatically
restricted in the number of topics on which they may bargain99 and must
rely on voluntary dues for financial security. On the other hand, federal
unions do not have as much responsibility for processing grievances and
therefore not as much power over their members as do most private sec-
tor unions.
1. The Federal Labor Relations Authority
Title VII codified the Federal Labor Relations Authority t ° which
Congress empowered, inter alia,101 to conduct hearings and resolve com-
in the federal sector, see supra note 92, it is somewhat surprising that Title VII does not specifically
contain prohibitory language to this effect. The prohibition apparently arises from the operation of
§ 7115(a). This provision allows an agency to deduct union dues from an employee's pay only if the
employee authorizes this action in writing. If Title VII permitted union shop provisions, the em-
ployee would not have this "power to authorize" dues deduction, but would be required to pay union
dues after a designated date.
97. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. Under the Railway Labor Act employees may
pursue their own grievances before the National Railway Adjustment Board. See supra notes 65 to
67 and accompanying text.
98. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-14. Not every agency action is within the jurisdiction of the MSPB,
and not every employee may take an appeal to the MSPB even assuming the agency action qualifies.
A federal employee may appeal an adverse agency action with the Merit Systems Protection Board if
she is a non-probationary federal employee and the agency removed her from her job, suspended her
for 14 days or longer, or reduced her grade or pay. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512 & 7513(d). Lesser suspensions,
reprimands or other disciplinary actions do not qualify as "adverse actions" under the statute, and
the employee is ineligible to appeal an agency decision of any type to the MSPB if she is a probation-
ary employee. See generally Developments, supra note 2, at 1636-37.
99. As Broida states, supra note 91, at 441-42:
In the private sector, everything that is important is negotiable: wages, seniority, job con-
tent, transfer rights, overtime distribution, pension and retirement plans, health and wel-
fare benefits, promotion policy, vacation and sick leave, supplemental unemployment
benefits, tenure, work evaluation methods, and even strikes. In the federal sector, little of
real importance is negotiable. Wages, retirement benefits, and .conditions of tenure are
established by law, and there is no right to strike .... Federal sector contracts are replete
with redundant provisions reiterating [federal] laws and regulations.
100. See 5 U.S.C. § 7104.
101. The Federal Labor Relations Authority is also empowered to consider bargaining unit de-
terminations, supervise and conduct elections, prescribe criteria and resolve disputes over national
consultation rights, determine the "compelling need" for agency rules, resolve issues relating to the
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plaints of union and agency unfair labor practices. Prior to the creation
of the Authority, unfair labor practice procedures were governed by Ex-
ecutive Orders. 0 2 Under the former procedures, the Assistant Secretary
of Labor prosecuted unfair labor practices, with appeals taken to the
Federal Labor Relations Council. 103 This procedure created a potentially
biased appeals process, however, because the Council was composed of
the Secretary of Labor, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission,
and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. 1°4 In addi-
tion to the obvious potential bias of the Secretary of Labor, all three
members of the appellate body were appointed by the executive branch
and were "responsible primarily as top managers in the incumbent ad-
ministration."105  Title VII gave the Authority comprehensive jurisdic-
tion in federal labor relations matters and assured "impartial
adjudication of labor-management cases by providing for a new Board
whose members [were] selected independently ... rather than by virtue
of their service as Federal managers."'10 6
The Authority was modeled on the National Labor Relations
Board,10 7 its counterpart in the private sector.10 8 In addition to the gen-
eral members of the Authority, the President appoints a General Counsel
whose duties include investigating unfair labor practices and prosecuting
duty to bargain in good faith, prescribe criteria relating to the granting of consultation rights, and
resolve exceptions to arbitration awards. See 5 U.S.C. § 7105.
102. Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2729; see also Cooper & Bauer, supra note 77, at 513-
19; Developments, supra note 2, at 1631-32.
103. Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2729-30.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2730.
106. Id.
107. The Railway Labor Act did not create an administrative agency comparable to the NLRB
(or the FLRA). See Communication Workers v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641, 2647 (1988). Contract
disputes under the RLA are taken to the National Railway Adjustment Board. The NRAB is an
arbitration board composed of carrier and union appointees. See 45 U.S.C. § 153 First(a). The
NRAB is authorized to grant hearings and issue awards in contract disputes. Id. at § 153 First(m).
Any party aggrieved by a final order, or by the NRAB's failure to issue an order, may petition a
United States District Court to review the NRAB's determination. Id. at § 153 First(q).
The RLA created a second dispute resolution panel-the National Mediation Board-the mem-
bers of which the President appoints. Id. at § 154 First. The Mediation Board has jurisdiction over
threatened strikes, disputes over bargaining representative elections, disputes over changes in pay,
rules or working conditions, or any dispute not referable to the NRAB. Id. at § 155 First.
108. The composition of the Federal Labor Relations Authority is prescribed in § 7104, a provi-
sion similar to § 3(a) of the National Labor Relations Act which establishes the structure of the
National Labor Relations Board. The NLRB is composed of five members, appointed to five-year
terms, with one member designated by the President to serve as Chairperson. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a).
Similarly, the President appoints, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the three members who
comprise the Authority, and designates one of the members as the Chairperson of the Authority. 5
U.S.C. § 7104(b). The Members are appointed to five-year terms and are removable for "ineffi-
ciency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Id. The Authority may delegate its administrative
duties to Regional Directors and its unfair labor practice duties to Administrative Law Judges under
§ 7105(e).
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complaints. 109 These duties are essentially identical to those of the
NLRB's General Counsel.' 10 Under Title VII, Congress intended that
[t]he General Counsel ... be autonomous in investigating unfair labor
practice complaints [and] in making 'final decisions' as to which cases
to prosecute before the Authority in its capacity as decision maker....
Specifically, the Authority would neither direct the General Counsel
concerning which unfair labor practice cases to prosecute nor review
the General Counsel's determinations not to prosecute, just as the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board does not exercise such control over its
General Counsel. "'
Thus, both the FLRA and the NLRB General Counsel function indepen-
dently of their Boards and have unreviewable discretion whether to issue
unfair labor practice complaints.
2. Representation Rights and Duties
Once a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit selects a
union in a secret ballot vote conducted by the Authority, the agency is
under a duty to recognize the union as the exclusive bargaining represen-
tative of its employees. 112 In the private sector, recognition may result
from either a successful majority election or through voluntary agree-
ment of the employer after the union conclusively demonstrates majority
support. 113
After the election of a federal union, Title VII requires that the la-
bor organization "represent all employees in the unit . . . without dis-
crimination and without regard to labor organization membership."" 14
109. 5 U.S.C. § 7104(f). The President may remove the General Counsel of the FLRA at any
time, for any reason. Id.
110. It was the legislators' intent that "unfair labor practice complaints ... be handled by the
General Counsel of the Authority in a manner essentially identical to National Labor Relations
Board practices in the private sector." Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2828.
111. Id. at 2824.
112. 5 U.S.C. § 7111. If a petition for election is filed with the Authority showing that 30% of
the employees wish to be represented by the union, the Authority will investigate the petition and
conduct a hearing. Upon finding that a question concerning representation exists, the Federal Labor
Relations Authority supervises an election and certifies the results. A labor organization showing at
least 10% support of the employees may intervene and appear on the ballot. The Authority deter-
mines who is eligible to vote and conducts a run-off election if no category on the ballot (one cate-
gory being "no choice") receives a majority of votes cast. Election procedures under the NLRA are
similar. Cf 29 U.S.C. § 159.
113. Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act has been interpreted to permit voluntary
recognition of an employee representative that shows majority support; however, a good faith mis-
take as to the majority status of the employee representative does not provide a defense to a charge
that the employer illegally recognized a union which, in fact, did not have majority support at the
time of recognition. See International Ladies Garment Workers Union (Bernhard Altmann Corp.)
v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
114. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(1). "The language itself is taken almost verbatim from President Ken-
nedy's Executive Order No. 10988." Brower, The Duty of Fair Representation under the Civil Ser-
vice Reform Act: Judicial Power to Protect Employee Rights, 40 OKLA. L. REV. 361, 369 (1987).
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Neither the National Labor Relations Act nor the Railway Labor Act
includes this specific language, but, as noted earlier, the courts have in-
ferred a duty of fair representation on private sector unions as the quid
pro quo for being granted exclusive bargaining representative status. 15
Title VII does not define the terms "without discrimination" and the
courts have had to address the question whether Congress intended to
impose on federal unions the same duty courts imposed on private sector
unions or whether Congress intended to impose a greater or lesser
duty."t 6 In general, courts have imposed the private sector duty on fed-
eral unions." 7 One court specifically held that "Congress adopted for
government employee unions the private sector duty of fair representa-
tion," and rejected the argument that Title VII imposes a greater fair
representation duty on federal unions. 118
Title VII also enables a federal employee to request that her exclu-
sive representative be present at any grievance or investigatory interviews
of the employee. 119 As with the duty of fair representation, the private
sector National Labor Relations Act does not contain any explicit lan-
guage to this effect, but the Supreme Court has inferred this right to
private sector employees. 20
The duty to bargain in good faith is another duty Title VII imposes
on the union and agency.' 2' This duty requires each side to approach
contract negotiations with a sincere resolve to reach an agreement, to
115. See supra notes 14 to 33 and accompanying text.
116. Brower, supra note 114, at 369-70, notes that because the language was taken from the
Executive Order, it might be argued that the language was directed not at the duty of fair representa-
tion, but at protecting union members' civil rights. "Antidiscrimination was a priority of the Ken-
nedy administration, and thus antidiscrimination provisions were specifically included in the
executive order as mandatory qualifications for unions in the federal sector." Id. at 370 (citations
omitted).
117. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 916 v. FLRA, 812 F.2d 1326 (10th
Cir. 1987); National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 800 F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1986); National
Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 721 F.2d 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
118. NTEU, 800 F.2d at 1171. See also AFGE, Local 916, 812 F.2d at 1327 ("[T]he roots of the
duty of fair representation should coincide for both public and private labor unions.").
119. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2).
120. In NLRB v. J. Weingarten Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the § 7
rights of private sector employees include a right to have a union official present at an investigatory
interview, and thus established what have become known as Weingarten rights. Section 7114(a)(3)
of the Civil Service Reform Act requires that the agency inform its employees annually of the exist-
ence of their Weingarten rights. The private sector employer is under no such duty to inform.
Granting exclusive recognition to a federal union does not preclude an employee from being repre-
sented by an outside attorney or representative in a grievance proceeding, or from exercising her own
right individually to pursue a grievance. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(5). An employee under the NLRA has
the right to present grievances individually to her employer without union intervention provided the
union has been given an opportunity to be present at the grievance adjustment. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a).
121. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(4).
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meet at reasonable times and places, to furnish data-to the extent not
prohibited by law-kept in the regular course of business and necessary
for full discussion of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining,
and to reduce any agreement to writing.' 22
3. Grievance and Arbitration Procedures
Title VII requires the parties to include a negotiated grievance pro-
cedure in every collective bargaining agreement. 123 The grievance proce-
dure must include provisions that allow individual employees to present
their own grievances to the agency1 24 and that require unsettled griev-
ances to be taken to binding arbitration. 25 Arbitration, however, may
only be invoked by the agency or the union, not by the individual em-
ployee. ' 26 In the private sector, decisions to include or exclude grievance
and arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements are left solely
to the discretion of the parties to the agreement.
Assuming either the union or agency invokes arbitration, the arbi-
trator's award may be appealed to the Federal Labor Relations Author-
ity if the appeal is taken within thirty days of the issuance of the
award.127 The Authority may reverse an award on the grounds that it is
contrary to "law, rule, or regulation" or "on other grounds similar to
those applied by Federal courts in private sector labor-management rela-
tions."1 28 Judicial review of private sector arbitration awards is strictly
limited. Interpreting the arbitration provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Supreme Court held that private sector arbitration
awards will be upheld so long as they draw their essence from the collec-
tive bargaining contract. 129 Title VII similarly limits the Authority's
122. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b). See also 5 U.S.C. § 7117. Similar provisions exist in the National La-
bor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) & 158(b)(3).
Under § 7114(c), the head of an agency has the right to approve or reject any collective bargain-
ing agreement the parties reach. The purpose of the provision is to ensure that agreements conform
to applicable laws, policies and regulations. Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2831. A similar
provision was contained in Executive Order 11,491. Id. No similar statutory provisions exist in the
private sector where the parties determine when an agreement becomes effective.
123. See 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1).
124. Id. at § 7121(b)(A) & (B).
125. Id. at § 7121(b)(3)(C).
126. Id. Title VII excludes from this procedure such grievances as claims involving prohibited
political activity; retirement, life or health insurance claims; claims involving suspensions or remov-
als for national security reasons; claims involving examinations, certifications or appointments; or
the classification of a position which does not result in the reduction of grade or pay of an employee.
5 U.S.C. § 7121(c).
127. See 5 U.S.C. § 7122.
128. Id. at § 7122(a).
129. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (an
arbitrator's award is "legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
1988]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ability to review the merits of a federal sector arbitration award.
4. Unfair Labor Practices
In addition to the "private" system of grievance and arbitration pro-
cedures, the breach of certain duties Title VII imposes on unions and
agencies may be remedied through unfair labor practice proceedings
before the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Section 7116 of Title VII
defines agency and union unfair labor practices. For the agency, it is an
unfair labor practice to: interfere with an employee's rights under the
Act; encourage or discourage union membership; sponsor a labor organi-
zation; discriminate against an employee for filing a complaint; refuse to
negotiate in good faith or cooperate in impasse procedures;1 30 enforce a
rule which is in conflict with the collective bargaining agreement; or
otherwise fail to comply with the Act. 131 For unions, it is an unfair labor
practice to: interfere with an employee's rights protected by the Act;
cause an agency to discriminate against an employee; hinder an em-
ployee's work performance; discriminate against an employee regarding
membership in the union on the basis of race, color, creed, national ori-
gin, sex, age, preferential or nonpreferential civil service status, political
affiliation, marital status or handicapping condition; refuse to negotiate
in good faith or cooperate in impasse proceedings; call or condone partic-
ipation in a strike or picketing; 132 or fail to comply with other provisions
of the Act. Section 7116 restricts aggrieved parties to one avenue of re-
lief and thereby prevents abuse of the protections designed to process
disputes efficiently.1 33
Once an unfair labor practice charge is filed with the Authority, the
agreement"); see also Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration A wards: The Clash Between the
Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1988).
130. Title VII provides, at 5 U.S.C. § 7119, that the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
assist agencies and unions in resolving negotiation impasses. This section also provides for the crea-
tion of the Federal Service Impasses Panel. The FSIP is composed of the Chairperson of the Author-
ity and at least six other members appointed by the President. The Panel offers means of resolving
impasses, and, if the parties do not reach resolution, may "take whatever action is necessary and not
inconsistent with this chapter to resolve the impasse." 5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(5)(B)(iii). The FMCS
services are available to private sector unions to help resolve negotiation impasse, but, because the
right to strike is preserved in the private sector, the National Labor Relations Act contains no provi-
sion similar to § 7119(c)(5).
131. 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a). The National Labor Relations Act provides similar unfair labor prac-
tice provisions at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
132. The Act permits "[i]nforrnational picketing which does not interfere with an agency's oper-
ations." 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b).
133. Issues that can be raised under the statutory appeals procedure (MSPB appeals) may not be
raised in an unfair labor practice charge. 5 U.S.C. § 7116(d). Employees have the option of using
either the negotiated grievance procedure ("contract remedies") or an appeals procedure, but not
both. Also an issue that could be raised as a contract grievance may instead be raised as an unfair
labor practice, but not both. Id.
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General Counsel investigates the charge and, in its sole discretion, issues
an unfair labor practice complaint. 34 If a complaint is issued, the Gen-
eral Counsel prosecutes the charge before an Administrative Law Judge
of the Authority, and the A.L.J. then determines if an unfair labor prac-
tice occurred.
Title VII empowers the Authority to remedy unfair labor practices
in four ways: 1) the Authority may order the agency or union to cease
and desist its unfair labor practices; 2) the Authority may require the
parties to renegotiate a collective bargaining agreement; 3) it may rein-
state an employee with back pay; or 4) it may take other action that
carries out the purpose of the statute.1 35
5. Judicial Review
Under section 7123 of Title VII, any party aggrieved by a final order
of the Authority may, within 60 days, petition a United States Court of
Appeals to review the decision.136 Title VII excludes from review any
Authority decisions involving arbitration awards and bargaining unit de-
terminations. 137 Similar provisions exist in the private sector. 38 Section
7123 also allows the Authority to petition a court of appeals to enforce
its decisions, 139 or to petition the district court to enjoin continuing un-
134. 5 U.S.C. § 7118(a)(l). The decision of the General Counsel whether to issue a complaint is
not reviewable. See, e.g., Turgeon v. FLRA, 677 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that review of
final orders is permitted, but that failure to issue a complaint is not a reviewable final order); Wilson
v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 202, 206 (M.D. Pa. 1984) ("The decision to issue or to decline to issue
an unfair labor practice complaint is not subject to judicial review."). Thus, if the General Counsel
finds that a charge is nonmeritorious, the charging party may not appeal the decision. See Legisla-
tive History, supra note 3, at 2828-29. Such discretion is also granted to the NLRB's General Coun-
sel under 29 U.S.C. § 160(c), and a decision not to issue a complaint is similarly unreviewable. See
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 138-39 (1975). Employees under the RLA, however,
are not subject to such unreviewable discretion. The NRAB hears all complaints and the employee
may petition a United States District Court to review the NRAB's decision not to make an award.
45 U.S.C. § 153 First(q).
135. 5 U.S.C. § 7118(a)(7). The NLRA allows the Board to issue cease and desist orders, rein-
state employees with backpay, and take other action that carries out the statute's purpose. 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c).
Title VII imposed a six-month limitations period for filing unfair labor practices. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7118(a)(4)(A); cf 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (six-month limitation period in private sector). If, however,
there was a failure of the federal agency or union to perform a duty owed to the employee, or if there
was a concealment that prevented the discovery of the unfair labor practice, the Authority's General
Counsel may issue a complaint based on a charge filed within six months of the discovery of the
unfair labor practice. 5 U.S.C. § 7118(4)(B); cf 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (exception to six-month limita-
tions period available only to an aggrieved party who was prevented from filing a charge by reason of
service in the armed forces).
136. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a). Proper venue is in the circuit in which the aggrieved party resides or
transacts business, or in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Id. at § 7123(a)(2).
137. Id. at § 7123(a)(1).
138. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) & (f).
139. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(b).
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fair labor practices. t4 0 The National Labor Relations Act provides for
similar judicial intervention to enforce Board orders or to issue tempo-
rary restraining orders.1 4 1
As this review reflects, the Civil Service Reform Act is a comprehen-
sive statute patterned in part on the pre-existing Executive Orders and in
part on the private sector National Labor Relations Act. Courts soon
disputed, however, whether the Act imposed a federal duty of fair repre-
sentation that, like private sector fair representation suits, was enforce-
able in the federal courts.
III. FAIR REPRESENTATION IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR
After Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act in 1978, federal
employees began to bring breach of duty of fair representation suits di-
rectly into federal district courts. In general, the courts held that there
was no subject matter jurisdiction over the employees' suits, although a
few courts disagreed. The various court decisions addressing the juris-
dictional question can be grouped by the type of analysis the courts used.
One analysis considered whether the private sector Vaca v. Sipes preemp-
tion doctrine could be employed in the federal sector. 142 A second type
of analysis focused on the specific jurisdictional questions involved in a
federal fair representation suit.1 43 Finally, in a third type of analysis,
courts asked whether recognizing federal sector fair representation suits
would produce adverse consequences in federal labor/management
140. Id. at § 7123(d).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) & (h).
In 1947, Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act by passing the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act. Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a),
extends to federal district courts a general grant of jurisdiction to hear breach of contract claims
against employers or unions. A similar extension of jurisdiction was not made in the Railway Labor
Act, and no such provision was included in the Civil Service Reform Act.
142. See infra notes 145 to 204 and accompanying text.
A recent Supreme Court decision may have influenced these courts' preemption arguments. In
United States v. Fausto, 108 S. Ct. 668 (1988), the Court held that the purpose, text and structure of
the Civil Service Reform Act combined to support the holding that the CSRA preempted the pre-
existing right of certain federal employees to seek back pay in the Claims Court under the Back Pay
Act. Id. at 671. In Fausto, a federal agency wrongfully discharged a federal employee. Id. at 670.
The CSRA did not grant the employee a right to appeal his discharge to the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board because he was classified as a "nonpreference eligible in the excepted service." Id. The
employee, therefore, filed suit in the Claims Court under the Back Pay Act. Id. at 671. This remedy
was available to employees of plaintiff's classification before Congress passed the CSRA. The Back
Pay Act permits federal employees to recover back pay if their agency unjustly discharges them. See
5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1982). The Supreme Court held, however, that Congress carefully weighed all
relevant factors and decided to revoke certain employee's Back Pay Act remedies when it passed the
CSRA. Fausto, 108 S. Ct. at 673-74. The dissent could find neither expressed nor implied legislative
intent to repeal the pre-existing remedy. It at 679-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. See infra notes 205 to 234 and accompanying text.
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relations. 144
A. Vaca Preemption
Courts that found jurisdiction over federal fair representation cases
often justified their holdings by analogizing to the private sector fair rep-
resentation model as embodied in the Supreme Court's decision Vaca v.
Sipes.145 The Tenth Circuit, in Pham v. American Federation of Govern-
ment Employees, Local 916,146 held that a union which represented fed-
eral employees owed the same fair representation duty to its employees as
a union which represented private employees and that federal employees
could similarly enforce the fair representation duty in federal court. In
Pham, the federal employee brought suit in state court against her union
after the union inadvertently mailed her grievance complaint ninety days
after the limitations period expired. 147 The union removed the em-
ployee's suit to federal district court and filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 148 The district court granted the mo-
tion to dismiss, holding that the Civil Service Reform Act implicitly pre-
empted a private suit for damages in district court.1 49 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit reversed.1 50 The Pham court acknowledged that it was
reluctant to interfere with the complex federal sector labor-management
scheme, but the court found no justification to "barricade the only re-
maining avenue of relief" open to the aggrieved federal employee.1 51
The Pham court first reviewed the legislative history of the Civil
Service Reform Act and noted that the Act was modeled after the private
sector National Labor Relations Act.' 52 The court observed that federal
sector unfair labor practice proceedings before the Federal Labor Rela-
tions Authority were designed to be administered in the same manner as
144. See infra notes 235 to 252 and accompanying text.
145. 386 U.S. 171 (1967); see supra notes 36 to 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Court's opinion.
146. 799 F.2d 634, 639 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2032 (1988).
147. Id. at 635. The Tenth Circuit addressed only the jurisdictional arguments and declined to
comment on whether the union's conduct in this case actually constituted a breach of its duty of fair
representation. Id. at 639.
148. Id. at 635. In the alternative, the union argued that the employee's suit was barred by the
six-month statute of limitations inferred under the United States Supreme Court's DelCostello deci-
sion. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
149. Pham, 799 F.2d at 636. The lower court's analysis hinged on the absence of a specific
jurisdictional grant similar to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, and on the court's
belief that deference to the expertise of Federal Labor Relations Authority in federal labor-manage-
ment relations was appropriate. Id. The district court did not reach the union's alternative conten-
tion that the statute of limitations barred the employee's action.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 636-37.
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private sector unfair labor practice proceedings before the National La-
bor Relations Board.1 53 The court stated that the Civil Service Reform
Act, like private sector labor laws, was founded on the idea that the labor
organization was the exclusive representative of the employees in a bar-
gaining unit. 154 According to the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court's
decision in Vaca v. Sipes reaffirmed that a statutory grant of exclusivity
carried with it the duty to represent fairly all employees in the bargaining
unit. 155 It followed, the court reasoned, that similar duties accrued to
federal unions. The court reasoned further that the Supreme Court held
in Vaca that private sector labor laws did not preempt a private em-
ployee's suit in district court for breach of this duty of fair representation
and that this holding was directly applicable to the federal sector. 156 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that "to the extent private employees have ac-
cess to federal courts to redress grievances against their unions for breach
of fair representation, so, too, have federal employees."' 157
The Pham court dismissed the argument that Congress incorporated
in the Civil Service Reform Act itself a duty of fair representation. The
duty contained in section 7114 of the Act, 158 according to the court, was
153. Id. at 637 (quoting Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2828).
154. 5 U.S.C. § 7111 grants exclusive bargaining rights to labor organizations elected by a ma-
jority of the employees in the bargaining unit.
155. Pham, 799 F.2d at 637.
156. Id. at 638.
157. Id. at 639.
Following a similar line of reasoning, the district court in Naylor v. American Federation of
Government Employees Local 446, 580 F. Supp. 137 (W.D.N.C. 1983), aff'd without written opin-
ion, 727 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 850 (1984), analogized to the Vaca preemption
doctrine when it denied the union's motion to dismiss and held that the federal employee could
maintain a fair representation action in district court. Id. at 139. The employee alleged that the
union failed to inform him of his right to invoke the grievance and arbitration procedure under the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 138. The court observed that Congress drafted the federal
sector Civil Service Reform Act to follow the private sector National Labor Relations Act. Id. at
139. It then reasoned that since the Supreme Court had decided in Vaca v. Sipes that the National
Labor Relations Act did not preempt a private employee's right to bring a fair representation action
in federal court, then the Supreme Court would also hold that the Civil Service Reform Act did not
preempt a federal employee's fair representation suit in federal court. Id. (The court analogized
solely to Vaca v. Sipes without addressing congressional omission of a jurisdictional grant for fair
representation suits or any potential adverse consequences from a federal sector fair representation
action.)
The Naylor court then addressed the merits of the employee's claim and granted the union's
motion for summary judgment, finding that the union did not breach its duty of fair representation
to the employee. Id. at 140. The court held that not only were there no facts in the record support-
ing the employee's claim that the union acted arbitrarily or in bad faith, but that "the record
prove[d] the opposite-that is, that the representation was proper and in accord with good prac-
tices." Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court without written opinion. Naylor v. Ameri-
can Fed'n of Gov't Employees Local 446, 727 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1984). Certiorari was later denied
by the United States Supreme Court. 469 U.S. 850 (1984).
158. Pham, 799 F.2d at 639. Section 7114(a)(1) of the Civil Service Reform Act provides, in
pertinent part: "An exclusive representative is responsible for representing the interests of all em-
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simply a duty not to discriminate on the basis of union membership,
whereas the duty of fair representation was "much broader than a simple
prohibition against treating union members differently" from non-mem-
bers. 159 The court therefore concluded that the Civil Service Reform Act
did not contain a statutory duty and the court would infer the duty and
extend jurisdiction over federal fair representation suits just as courts had
previously inferred the duty and extended jurisdiction over private sector
fair representation suits. 160
Focusing on the need to protect individual employee interests in the
face of the labor statute's institutional focus, the district court in
Karahalios v. Defense Language Institute (Karahalios 1)161 also held that
ployees in the unit it represents without discrimination and without regard to labor organization
membership." 5 U.S.C. § 7114. By contrast, private sector labor statutes do not contain explicit
non-discriminatory duties and the courts have inferred a duty of fair representation to protect em-
ployees from arbitrary union conduct. See supra notes 14 to 23 and accompanying text.
159. Pham, 799 F.2d at 639.
160. Id. The Pham court also addressed the "specific jurisdiction" analysis and held that the
omission of specific fair representation jurisdiction was not controlling. For a discussion of the
court's reasoning, see infra notes 205 to 209 and accompanying text.
The Tenth Circuit remanded Pham to the district court to determine if, on the facts, the union
breached its duty of fair representation.
161. 534 F. Supp. 1202 (N.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 821 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1987), cert granted, 108
S. Ct. 2032 (1988) [hereinafter Karahalios I]. Efthimios Karahalios' case has had a long and thus far
unsuccessful tour in the federal court system. In Karahalios I, Karahalios brought a hybrid fair
representation suit in federal district court under § 1331 federal question jurisdiction. Both the
agency and union filed motions to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the court
denied the union's motion, but granted the agency's motion. Id. at 1212. The court dismissed the
agency because jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim against a federal government agency had
to founded on a jurisdictional statute such as § 1491. Id. Section 1491 vests exclusive jurisdiction in
the United States Claims Court against the government over breach of contract and other civil
actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982). Since
Karahalios insufficiently alleged jurisdiction over the federal agency, the court granted the agency's
motion to dismiss with leave to amend. Karahaios 1, 534 F.Supp. at 1212.
Karahalios then filed a motion asking the court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the breach
of contract claim against the agency. Karahalios v. Defense Language Inst., 544 F. Supp. 77 (N.D.
Cal. 1982), rev'd 821 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2032 (1988) [hereinafter
Karahalios II]. The court denied this motion and the case proceeded to trial. At trial, the court
found that the union breached its duty of fair representation. Karahalios v. Defense Language Inst.,
613 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 821 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct.
2032 (1988) [hereinafter Karahalios III]. The court found that the union breached its duty of fair
representation in three ways: (1) it took a fellow employee's grievance to arbitration without ad-
dressing the consequences to Karahalios; (2) it failed to notify Karahalios of this arbitration in order
to give him an opportunity to represent his interests at the hearing; and (3) it refused to take
Karahalios' grievance to arbitration without addressing the merits of his claim. Id. at 446-48.
The court reluctantly held that Karahalios was ineligible for back pay damages because the
court could not say with any degree of certainty that Karahalios would have retained the course
developer position had the union not breached its duty of fair representation. Id. at 449. The court
awarded attorney fees, however, by invoking an exception which allowed such awards when the
plaintiff's litigation conferred substantial benefit on others as well as plaintiff. Id. at 450. The court
stated that "plaintiff's suit serves as a valuable precedent for every federal employee who prosecutes
a fair representation claim in federal district court." Id. at 451.
The union appealed and the Ninth Circuit overturned the $35,000 attorney fee award and dis-
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it exercised subject matter jurisdiction over federal fair representation
suits. The first federal fair representation suit to be brought to a federal
district court,162 the case arose when Efthimios Karahalios was demoted
from his position as a Greek. instructor after the union won an arbitration
ruling in favor of a fellow employee. 163 The union had taken the fellow
employee's grievance to arbitration but did not notify Karahalios or give
him a chance to be represented at the arbitration hearing. 164 After learn-
ing of his demotion, Karahalios filed a grievance with the union. The
union refused to process the grievance, however, on the ground that rep-
resenting Karahalios would conflict with the union's previous successful
representation of the fellow employee.165
Karahalios filed unfair labor practice charges against the union
before the Federal Labor Relations Authority, and the General Counsel
authorized a complaint on the ground that the union had breached its
duty of fair representation. 166 Before the complaint was drawn, however,
the Regional Director and the union reached a settlement: the union
agreed to inform all bargaining unit members that it would no longer tell
them that it could not represent more than one employee seeking the
missed the case. Karahalios v. Defense Language Inst., 821 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted,
108 S. Ct. 2032 (1988) [hereinafter Karahalios IV].
162. Two prior cases dealt tangentially with federal subject matter jurisdiction and the Civil
Service Reform Act. Both cases, however, involved a union unsuccessfully attempting to force an
agency to arbitrate a dispute.
In the first case, National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1263 v. Commandant, De-
fense Language Institute, 493 F. Supp. 675 (N.D. Cal. 1980), the union sought to enjoin the agency
to bargain over the impact of a proposed reduction in the work force. The court held that the CSRA
provided limited access for federal court intervention and that it would be "inconsistent for the
district court to assume jurisdiction over subject matter entrusted to the expertise of the agency."
Id. at 679.
In the second case, the Ninth Circuit considered the same issue. Columbia Power Trades Coun-
cil v. United States Dep't of Energy, 671 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1982) (Judge Ornck, who wrote the
Local 1263 opinion above, also wrote the Columbia Power opinion). In Columbia Power, the union
sought a mandamus order directing the agency to implement arbitrated wage increases, but the
district court dismissed the complaint. Id. at 326. On appeal, District Court Judge Orrick, sitting
by designation, affirmed the lower court and held that the Trade Council's exclusive remedy was
before the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Id. at 327.
163. Karahalios I, 534 F. Supp. at 1204.
164. Id.
165. Id. The fellow employee, Simon Kuntelos, had previously occupied the instructor position
before the agency eliminated it. When the agency reopened the position and gave it to Karahalios,
Kuntelos filed a grievance. The union took Kuntelos' grievance to arbitration after the agency de-
nied relief, and the arbitrators decided that Karahalios' placement in the position over Kuntelos was
erroneous. The agency, following the arbitrator's award, reassigned Kuntelos to the higher position
and demoted Karahalios. The union did not notify Karahalios that it was representing Kuntelos at
the arbitration until after the arbitrator awarded the.job to Kuntelos. Id.
166. Id. The Regional Director of the FLRA had found no grounds to issue a complaint against
either the union or the agency and Karahalios appealed this decision to the General Counsel. The
General Counsel of the FLRA, however, held that the union breached its duty of fair representation
and ordered the Regional Director to issue a complaint. Id.
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same position.1 67 The negotiated settlement provided no personal rem-
edy for Karahalios, who then instituted suit in federal district court.
In response to motions to dismiss Karahalios' complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction,1 68 the district court held that private sector
case law controlled the issue. 169 The Karahalios I court observed that,
just as the National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act had
not expressly established a duty of fair representation, the Civil Service
Reform Act had no express provision establishing a duty of fair represen-
tation for federal unions.17 0 Courts inferred the duty on private sector
unions, according to the court, and gave private sector employees the
right to sue for breach of the duty "despite the otherwise narrowly lim-
ited role of the courts under those statutes."1 71 The court observed that
a primary rationale for providing private sector employees with access to
district court was that administrative boards set up to regulate the labor
markets were more concerned with "broad questions of policy than with
individuals."' 72 The Karahalios court found this private sector rationale
equally applicable to the federal sector.1 73 In order to protect federal
employees who lacked adequate administrative remedies before the Fed-
eral Labor Relations Authority, the court concluded that the Civil Ser-
vice Reform Act did not preempt subject matter jurisdiction over the fair
representation claim. ' 74
167. Id. The General Counsel upheld the Regional Director's decision not to issue a complaint
against the agency. Id.
168. Id. Karahalios' complaint alleged that the union breached its duty of fair representation,
and that the agency breached its collective bargaining contract and violated Karahalios' constitu-
tional rights. Id. at 1204.
169. The court also addressed the "specific jurisdiction" analysis. See infra notes 210 to 215 and
accompanying text.
170. Karahalios I, 534 F. Supp. at 1207. The court did not address, in any of its three published
opinions, the argument that Congress included a federal duty of fair representation provision in
§ 7114 of the Civil Service Reform Act. At least one court has held that this "error" invalidated the
holding of the Karahalios decisions. See Warren v. Local 1759, American Fed'n of Gov't Employ-
ees, 764 F.2d 1395, 1399 (11th Cir. 1985).
171. Karahalios I, 534 F. Supp. at 1207.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1207-08.
The court went on to analyze Karahalios' breach of collective bargaining agreement claim
against the agency. The court also analogized this claim to private sector fair representation cases.
According to the court, when a private sector employer breaches a collective bargaining agreement,
employees sue the employer for breach of" 'a promise embedded in the collective-bargaining agree-
ment that was intended to confer a benefit upon the individual.'" Id. at 1209 (quoting Amalga-
mated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 298-99
(1971)). The court did not reach the question whether a collective bargaining agreement in the
federal sector conferred such a benefit upon the individual employee. To do so, the court said, the
claim would need to be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1346, the jurisdictional statute conferring power
on the district courts to hear breach of contract claims against the federal government. Id. To
qualify under § 1346, however, the amount in controversy would have to be $10,000 or less. Id. at
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In Karahalios 11,175 the district court further developed its reasoning
for rejecting the union's preemption argument.' 76 In this decision, the
court changed its focus slightly and highlighted the problem of unreview-
able administrative discretion over whether to pursue claims of breach of
fair representation. The central rationale of private sector fair represen-
tation suits, according to the Karahalios II court, was that private sector
employees were subject to the unreviewable discretion of the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board. 177 Since federal sector
employees were similarly subject to the unreviewable discretion of the
General Counsel of the Federal Labor Relations Authority, it followed
that courts must provide federal employees with a means to redress
1209-10 n.6. The court held that if his claim were for more than $10,000, Karahalios would have to
bring his claim against the agency in the Claims Court under § 1491. Id.
The court recognized the dilemma facing Karahalios in this situation: if the amount in contro-
versy were greater than $10,000 and he brought an action against the agency in the Claims Court, he
would not be able to pursue his action against the union in the same court because the Claims Court
would have no jurisdiction over the union. Id. Yet in order to prevail against the employer in the
Court of Claims, Karahalios would nonetheless have to prove that the union had breached its duty
of fair representation. Id.
The court then addressed Karahalios' constitutional claims against the agency. Id. at 1210.
Karahalios claimed that the agency deprived him of property (his job) without due process of law in
violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and that the collective bargaining agreement vio-
lated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. The court dismissed the four-
teenth amendment claims on the ground that the fourteenth amendment applied only to state action
and was not applicable to deprivations by a federal agency. Id. The court upheld the fifth amend-
ment claim on grounds that Karahalios alleged a property interest in his job arising from an under-
standing between him and the agency. Id. at 1211. The court held, however, that the agency was
protected by the sovereign immunity doctrine which limited the amount of damages Karahalios
could recover to back pay. Id.
175. Karahalios 11, 544 F. Supp. 77. After the decision in Karahalios I, Karahalios filed a mo-
tion to assume pendent jurisdiction over the breach of collective bargaining contract claim against
the agency. Apparently the amount in controversy was greater than $10,000 and Karahalios sought
to avoid bifurcating his case between the Claims Court and the district court. In his motion,
Karahalios argued that the inconvenience of litigating in two forums supported the district court's
assumption of pendent jurisdiction. Id. at 78. The court held, however, that it could not skirt the
§ 1346 amount-in-controversy requirement when Congress specifically required claims against the
government for more than $10,000 be brought in the Claims Court. Id.
The court suggested that Karahalios' fear that his damages award would be fragmented was
unfounded. Id. Since unions were rarely liable for large damages in fair representation cases, the
court wrote, Karahalios should bring one action in the Claims Court against the agency without
bothering to seek what would be an insignificant award from the union in district court. Id.
176. The court also addressed the "adverse consequences" argument in this opinion. See infra
text accompanying notes 236 to 239.
177. Id. at 79. The court noted that Congress, presumably aware of fair representation claims in
the private sector, did not foreclose fair representation suits in the federal sector when it enacted the
Civil Service Reform Act in 1978. The court reasoned that Congress did not confer a specific grant
of jurisdiction in the Act to bring fair representation suits in district court because the district courts
already had jurisdiction under § 1331. Id. Similarly, Congress did not specifically confer jurisdic-
tion over claims against federal agencies because, under §§ 1346 and 1491, jurisdiction already ex-
isted to bring suit against a federal agency. Id. The court held that jurisdiction existed before the
passage of the Civil Service Reform Act and Congress did not divest this jurisdiction when it passed
the Act. Id.
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grievances against federal unions. 178
In contrast to courts that recognized subject matter jurisdiction by
analogy to the private sector model, courts that denied jurisdiction over
federal fair representation claims held that the private sector preemption
doctrine was inapposite. One of the principle features that distinguished
the private sector model, according to these courts, is the existence of a
statutory duty of fair representation incorporated into the Civil Service
Reform Act itself. The Eleventh Circuit, in Warren v. Local 1759, Amer-
ican Federation of Government Employees,179 held that Congress in-
cluded section 7114 in the Act to impose an explicit duty of fair
representation on federal unions. This feature distinguished the federal
sector statute from the private sector statutes that did not contain an
explicit duty of fair representation provision.1 80 The employee in Warren
argued that the Act did not explicitly or implicitly divest a federal em-
ployee of the right to bring a fair representation suit in district court.' 8 '
According to the employee, the right to sue for breach of fair representa-
tion was judicially established before the passage of the Civil Service Re-
form Act and the Act did not specifically divest this right. 82  The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed.18 3 According to the court, the Act included
an explicit duty of fair representation that Congress empowered the Fed-
178. "[T]he fact that the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board has unlimited
discretion to refuse to issue a complaint is precisely why there is a need for a damages remedy
against the union and the employer. The Supreme Court made this abundantly clear in Vaca v.
Sipes." Id. at 81.
179. 764 F.2d 1395 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985). The employee in War-
ren had twice been suspended from his job, and had twice invoked the contractual grievance proce-
dures of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. After each grievance was denied, the employee
asked the union to take his claims to arbitration, but the union refused. Id. The employee then filed
unfair labor practice charges before the Federal Labor Relations Authority, but the Regional Direc-
tor declined to issue a complaint. Id. The General Counsel twice affirmed the Regional Director's
decisions, and the employee filed a breach of fair representation suit in district court against the
union. Id. at 1396. The district court granted the union's motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, and on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's decision. Id.
180. The Eleventh Circuit indicated that the district court's holding was founded on the belief
that the Civil Service Reform Act explicitly -provided a duty of fair representation in § 7114(a)(l),
and the union's breach of this provision was an unfair labor practice under § 7116 of the Act. Id. at
1396. The district court concluded that the Federal Labor Relations Authority had exclusive juris-
diction over fair representation claims because they were unfair labor practices. Id. at 1398. The
district court supported its conclusion by noting that the Civil Service Reform Act only permitted
judicial intervention in the three instances: (1) under § 7123(a), a person aggrieved by a final order of
the FLRA could appeal that order to a federal court of appeals, (2) under § 7123(b), the FLRA
could petition a federal court of appeals to enforce an order of the Authority or to provide temporary
relief or restraining order, and (3) under § 7123(d), the FLRA could petition a federal district court
for temporary injunctive relief upon issuing an unfair labor practice complaint. Id. at 1396.
181. Id. at 1396-97.
182. Id. at 1398-99.
183. For a discussion of the court's "lack of specific jurisdiction" analysis, see infra notes 216 to
221 and accompanying text.
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eral Labor Relations Authority to enforce. 18 4 The Warren court con-
cluded that the Authority therefore exercised exclusive jurisdiction over
federal fair representation cases.18 5
A similar rejection of the private sector model based on section 7114
occurred when the Ninth Circuit overruled the earlier Karahalios district
court decisions. In Karahalios IV,186 the court of appeals reasoned that
in passing the Civil Service Reform Act, Congress directly imposed a
duty of fair representation on federal unions through section 7114(a)(1),
and thus circumvented the need to infer a duty through judicial deci-
sions.' 87 The court added that Congress provided section 7118(a)(7)188
to enable the Federal Labor Relations Authority to remedy unfair labor
practices, such as a breach of the duty of fair representation. Thus, the
court concluded, the Act provided a clear duty on federal unions and an
equally clear remedy for aggrieved employees, thereby preempting fed-
eral fair representation suits in the courts.18 9
The Ninth Circuit rejected the employee's claim that federal court
jurisdiction was required because the Federal Labor Relations Authority
did not vigorously enforce the duty of fair representation. 90 The
184. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the employee's argument that the Civil Service Reform Act
had an implied duty of fair representation in addition to the explicit duty in § 7114(a). The em-
ployee argued that the implied duty arose from the grant of exclusivity to federal unions that § 7111
of the Act provided. The court stated that it could not disregard the explicit enumeration of the
duty in § 7114(a), and the corresponding remedy via an unfair labor practice charge in § 7116, in an
attempt to analogize to Karahalios. Id. at 1399 n.5.
The court distinguished Karahalios on two grounds. Id. at 1399. First, according to the court,
Karahalios relied on the faulty premise that there was no explicit duty of fair representation con-
tained in the Act. Id. The court contended that this omission clearly undermined the validity of the
Karahalios decision. Id. Second, according to the court, Karahalios reached the unwarranted con-
clusion that the Federal Labor Relations Authority was unable to provide relief to federal employees
who brought fair representation charges. According to the court, § 7118(a)(7) provides the Author-
ity with the power to order back pay or other relief upon a finding of an unfair labor practice. Id.
185. Id. at 1399. The employee in Warren argued that the Federal Labor Relations Authority
was lax in enforcement of the duty of fair representation, relying on Broida, supra note 91. The
court disagreed that the Authority was reticent to enforce the duty of fair representation as vigor-
ously as the duty is enforced in the private sector. Id. at 1399 n.6. "In view of the numerous FLRA
cases, cited in [the agency's] brief, in which relief was granted against the union for breach of the
duty of fair representation, we are unpersuaded by [the employee's] argument that the FLRA lacks
zeal in prosecution of duty of fair representation claims." Id.
186. 821 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2032 (1988). For discussion of the
procedural history of the Karahalios decisions, see supra note 161.
187. 821 F.2d at 1392.
188. Id. Section 7118(a)(7) provides that upon a finding of unfair labor practice committed by
either the union or employer, the Federal Labor Relations Authority may issue an order to cease and
desist, an order requiring the parties to renegotiate their collective bargaining agreement, or an order
requiring reinstatement and back pay. 5 U.S.C. § 7118(a). Congress gave the NLRB similar powers.
See supra note 135.
189. Karahalios IV, 821 F.2d at 1392.
190. Id. The employee cited Broida, supra note 91, to support his argument that the Authority
does not strongly enforce fair representation suits.
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Karahalios IV court noted that FLRA statistics showed that in fiscal year
1986 it filed only 227 complaints against federal labor unions.' 9 ' The
court stated that it was "open to interpretation whether the small
number of complaints actually issued reflect[ed] lack of zeal or lack of
real problems in this area." 192 The court dismissed the employee's case,
seeing no strong reason to disregard what it saw as Congress' intent to
channel the grievances of the federal employees to the Federal Labor
Relations Authority. 193 Noting what it called "a paradox," the court
stated that where Congress recognized no duty of fair representation (the
private sector model), the courts shaped a more potent remedy than
when Congress explicitly recognized the duty (the federal sector model).
According to the court, Congress created the duty but tempered the rem-
edy and in the process restrained "judicial creativity."'' 94
The district court in Tucker v. Defense Mapping Agency 195 also de-
nied jurisdiction over a federal fair representation suit by reasoning that
Congress intended to preempt federal court jurisdiction. 196  Although
recognizing that the Act did not explicitly call for preemption of federal
court jurisdiction, the Tucker court held that Congress intended the Act
to be the primary mode for vindicating employee rights in the federal
sector. 197 The court found that in passing the Act, Congress intended to
191. Id. Of the 227 complaints against labor unions brought before the FLRA General Counsel:
approximately Il1 were dismissed (49%), approximately 57 were withdrawn (25%), approximately
30 were settled (13%), and 31 complaints were issued (14%). Id. (citing FLRA, Report on Case
Handling Developments of the Office of General Counsel, FLRA Doc. 1335 at 39, 53 (1987)).
192. Id. The court stated that it had insufficient information to conclude that the Authority was
not vigorously pursuing fair representation claims. Id.
193. Id. at 1393.
194. Id.
195. 607 F. Supp. 1232 (D.R.I. 1985). The employees in Tucker accused the agency of breach-
ing the collective bargaining agreement by unilaterally changing the hours of employment to accom-
modate remodeling the agency offices. Id. at 1234-35. The contract provided that employees could
work their shifts at any time between 6:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m. Plaintiffs Tucker and Marx normally
started their shifts at 9:00 a.m. and finished at 5:30 p.m. During the remodeling of the offices,
however, the agency closed at 4:30 p.m., requiring Tucker and Marx to begin by 8:00 a.m. to finish
their shifts in time. The two employees objected to the changed schedules and continued to report
for work at 9:00 a.m. despite the new hours. Id. at 1236. Their missed hours were charged against
their accumulated leave time, and they claimed losses of $1,320 and $110 respectively. Id.
The employees brought suit in federal district court against the agency for breach of the collec-
tive bargaining contract due to the change in hours, and against the union for breach of fair repre-
sentation due to the union's alleged failure properly to process the employee's grievances regarding
this change. Id. It was undisputed, however, that neither employee demanded or received a written
decision after step two of the contractual grievance procedure and that neither employee demanded
that the union pursue their grievances with the agency director or take their grievance to arbitration.
Id. The plaintiffs also claimed violations of fifth and fourteenth amendment due process rights, and,
"for good measure, a pendent claim (never seriously urged or sensibly articulated) of abrogation of
rights ceded by the Rhode Island Constitution." Id. at 1233.
196. Id. at 1238.
197. Id. at 1239. The court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
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create an exclusive, efficient mechanism for addressing management/per-
sonnel relations in the federal sector.198 In this context, according to the
court, a Vaca-type remedy was unnecessary and counterproductive. 199
"[lJudicial intervention," the court wrote, "would ineluctably impede
critical management control in the public sector. ' ' 2°° The court con-
cluded that "there is no room in the CSRA stable for the Vaca steed...
[It] is simply a horse of another color."'201
367 (1983) essentially mandated the conclusion that the Civil Service Reform Act preempted such
private suits. Tucker, 607 F. Supp. at 1239.
In Bush, a federal employee brought a damages action in state court based on first amendment
violations claiming that his federal employer demoted him for making several highly critical state-
ments about the agency to the press. 462 U.S. at 369. The agency removed the case to federal
district court where that court granted the agency's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 371. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the employee, who had available reme-
dies for retaliatory discharge before the Civil Service Commission, could not sustain an independent
cause of action under the first amendment. Id. at 372.
While recognizing its power to create nonstatutory remedies, the Supreme Court, in a unani-
mous decision, held that the federal employee was "protected by an elaborate, comprehensive
scheme that encompass[ed] substantive provisions forbidding arbitrary action by supervisors." Id. at
385. The Court supported its decision to disallow the cause of action by stating that potential civil
liability would deter management personnel from imposing discipline in subsequent cases where
such action was in fact warranted. Id. at 389.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred in result but wrote separately to empha-
size his view that the Court's opinion turned on the existence of a statutory scheme that provided
"full compensation to civil service employees who [were] discharged or disciplined in violation of
their First Amendment rights" and that this remedy was "substantially as effective as a damages
action." Id. at 390.
Although the Tucker court noted that Bush dealt with a constitutional rights action against a
federal employer, the court held that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Bush supported a finding of
preemption in a fair representation suit. Tucker, 607 F. Supp. at 1240. The court stated that, in
essence, Bush stood for the proposition that the Civil Service Reform Act preempted the § 1331
federal question jurisdiction of the employee's claim. Id. Thus, according to the court's reasoning,
any other § 1331 jurisdiction cases, such as a breach of fair representation claim, would also be
preempted. Id. The court then cited other federal court decisions which supported the notion that
the Civil Service Reform Act was intended to be an exclusive statutory scheme regarding suits
against agencies in district court. Eg., Carter v. Kurzejeski, 540 F. Supp. 396 (W.D. Mo. 1982),
aff'd, 706 F.2d 835 (8th Cir. 1983) (denial of subject matter jurisdiction for injunctive relief for
employees and union who sued agency for discharges said to violate the employees' constitutional
rights); Veit v. Heckler, 746 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to
enjoin agency's practices or hear the employee's constitutional claims against the agency); Schrachta
v. Curtis, 752 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming, per curiam, the district court's dismissal of a suit
brought by an employee who claimed damages as a result of being passed over for a promotion).
198. Tucker, 607 F.Supp. at 1244.
199. Id. The court held that the employee's claims could be brought as unfair labor practices
before the FLRA. Id. at 1245.
200. Id. The court also stated that even if the independent cause of action existed for the em-
ployees in district court, plaintiffs' actions would be time-barred. The court held that the suit was
subject to the Civil Service Reform Act's six month limitations period defined in 5 U.S.C.
§ 7118(a)(4)(A), and was not filed in time. Id at 1245-46.
201. Id. at 1240 n.6. The court distinguished federal sector fair representation case law. Ac-
cording to the court, Karahalios I lacked precedential value after the Supreme Court's decision in
Bush v. Lucas. Id. at 1241. Further, the court stated that Karahalios was distinguishable because
the employee exhausted his administrative remedies, whereas in Tucker the employees did not. Id.
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The district court in Martel v. Carroll 202 also distinguished the pri-
vate sector model and held that jurisdiction did not exist to hear federal
fair representation claims. The Martel court found Vaca v. Sipes inappli-
cable to federal sector employees because a discharged federal employee,
unlike a private sector employee, "has a board to which he can appeal
regardless of the union's evaluation of his claim. ' 20 3 The Martel court
found that the availability of the Merit Systems Protection Board, from
which a federal employee could seek relief for certain adverse personnel
decisions, distinguished the private sector fair representation model be-
cause private sector employees had to rely on their unions to press any
grievance. 204
B. Specific Jurisdiction Analysis
Turning their focus from the applicability of the Vaca preemption
doctrine, courts also disputed how much impact the absence of specific
fair representation jurisdiction should have on whether federal fair repre-
sentation suits were cognizable in federal court. Courts that accepted
jurisdiction over federal fair representation suits held that the absence of
a specific jurisdictional grant in the Civil Service Reform Act was unim-
portant to the question whether federal courts may exercise jurisdiction
over federal fair representation claims. In Pham, the Tenth Circuit re-
viewed a district court decision that' had dismissed a federal employee's
suit on the ground that the Act lacked a section 301 jurisdiction clause to
support the fair representation suit.20 5 The Tenth Circuit noted that in
The court concluded that exhaustion of remedies before the Authority "was pivotal in reaching the
Karahalios result." Id.
For discussion of the Tucker court's "adverse consequences" analysis, see infra notes 249 to 252
and accompanying text.
202. 562 F. Supp. 443 (D. Mass. 1983). The employee in Martel claimed that, as a result of
being misled by his union and employer, he participated in the illegal air traffic controllers strike and
was discharged. Id. at 444. After the General Counsel of the Federal Labor Relations Authority
declined to file a complaint, the employee brought suit in federal district court. Id.
203. Id. at 445. The court was referring to the Merit Systems Protection Board. See supra notes
83 to 88 and accompanying text for discussion of the MSPB.
204. Id.
Another case which touched on the private sector analogy was Yates v. United States Soldiers'
and Airmen's Home, 533 F. Supp. 461 (D.D.C. 1982). There, the employee brought suit against her
agency-employer for breach of the collective bargaining contract. Id. at 462. The court denied
subject matter jurisdiction by reasoning that the FLRA's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices
preempted general federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 465. The case did not involve an allegation
that the union breached its duty of fair representation; the dispute was solely between the employee
and the agency for breach of the collective bargaining contract.
205. Pham, 799 F.2d at 638. The district court concluded that since the Civil Service Reform
Act did not explicitly provide a § 301 clause, an action in federal district court was preempted by the
Act. Id. The district court relied heavily on "the policy assumption that public interests are vastly
different from those in the private sector." Id. For discussion of the Tenth Circuit's private sector
analogy analysis, see supra notes 146 to 160 and accompanying text.
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the private sector, only the breach of collective bargaining agreement
claim against the employer is founded on section 301.206 In contrast, the
court stated, the fair representation claim against the union is implied
from the "exclusivity of representation" language of the National Labor
Relations Act itself. According to the Tenth Circuit, Congress was
aware of this distinction when it drafted the Civil Service Reform Act
and did not include a section 301 equivalent enabling an employee to sue
a federal agency because it did not want to waive the federal agency's
immunity in labor/management contexts. 20 7 Thus, the court held, Con-
gress prevented federal employees from suing their agencies but did not
limit their ability to sue their unions. 20 8 A contrary view, the court con-
cluded, would negate statutory history that linked the private sector la-
bor statutes with the federal sector Civil Service Reform Act.209
The court in Karahalios 11210 rejected a similar argument that the
FLRA exercised exclusive jurisdiction over federal fair representation
disputes because the CSRA did not contain a section 301 clause. Ac-
cording to this argument, the Authority should exercise exclusive juris-
diction over federal fair representation claims not only because Congress
failed to include a specific jurisdictional clause in the Act that would
have allowed federal court suits, but because Congress actually deleted a
section 301 clause originally included in the House version of the legisla-
tion that would have supported such claims. 21' The Karahalios H court
disputed the importance of this legislative history, however, and stated
that "[t]he deletion of the injunctive relief provision [of the House Bill
206. Id. The court relied on Supreme Court dictum in Del Costello International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) that defined a private sector fair representation suit as both a
§ 301 action against the employer and a § 1331 action against the union.
207. Id. at 639. The court stated that "[w]hile reasons exist for Congress not to insulate a pri-
vate employer from a damage suit by an aggrieved employee, those same reasons do not apply to the
United States." Id. The court did not specify what the reasons were or why they did not apply to
the federal government.
208. Id.
209. Id. The court referred to a passage in the legislative history suggesting that Congress
intended unfair labor practice proceedings in the federal sector be handled "in a manner essentially
identical to the National Labor Relations Board practices in the private sector." Id. at 637 (quoting
Legislative History, supra note 3 at 2828).
210. 544 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
211. Id. at 80. The argument that Congress intentionally deleted a § 301 provision in the Act
was said to be supported by Yates v. United Soldiers' and Airmen's Home, 533 F. Supp. 461, 463-64
(D.D.C. 1982). In Yates, the court held that Congress considered and rejected a "provision similar
to § 301" when it passed the Act and that this rejection showed Congress' intent to channel all
disputes involving enforcement of collective bargaining agreements through arbitration with appeal
to the FLRA. Id. at 464 & n.7. The provision the Yates court referred to would have permitted
either party to a collective bargaining agreement to petition a district court for an injunction forcing
the other party to arbitrate. Id. at 464 n.5. The Conference Committee eventually deleted this
provision from the Act. Id. See also supra note 204.
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did] not indicate any intent by Congress to deprive federal courts of juris-
diction to hear damages claims under the Act."' 212 The Karahalios II
court, in harmony with the Eleventh Circuit's approach, held that the
claim against the union rested on section 1331 federal question jurisdic-
tion. 213 In contrast, however, to the Eleventh Circuit's contention that
Congress sought to insulate federal agencies from liability, the court in
Karahalios II held that the Tucker Act provided federal employees with
the jurisdictional foundation for the breach of contract claim against a
federal agency. 214 The Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity of gov-
ernment agencies for breach of contract claims. Thus, the court con-
cluded, Congress did not include a section 301 provision in the Act
because Congress had already empowered federal employees under ex-
isting federal civil procedure laws to sue both their union and their
agency in a hybrid duty of fair representation action.215
Courts that denied jurisdiction to federal employees' fair representa-
tion suits pointed both to the lack of a specific jurisdictional grant in the
Act as well as the existence of alternative remedies when they held that
they lacked jurisdiction over federal fair representation claims. The
Eleventh Circuit, in Warren, found the lack of specific fair representation
jurisdiction decisive when it affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
federal employee's fair representation suit against his union. 216 The em-
ployee in Warren brought suit solely against the union, thus invoking
federal question jurisdiction under section 1331. The employee did not,
however, seek any relief against the federal agency. Notwithstanding this
fact, the Eleventh Circuit held that the employee's failure to name the
agency as a party in his fair representation suit was not controlling be-
cause there was an underlying allegation that the agency breached its
collective bargaining contract by discharging the employee.21 7 Once the
Warren court transformed the employee's fair representation suit against
his union into a hybrid fair representation suit including claims against
both the union and the federal agency, the court held that it lacked sub-
212. Karahalios II, 544 F. Supp. at 80. The court agreed that jurisdiction would not attach to an
employee's action if the employee sought to enjoin the agency to arbitrate, but jurisdiction would
attach if an employee sought to recover damages for breach of fair representation. Id.
213. Id. at 79. The court reasoned that § 1331 was the jurisdictional basis for a federal em-
ployee's fair representation suit against her union and that since § 1331 pre-dated the Act, Congress
did not need to give an additional grant in the statute itself. Id.
214. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346. District courts share concurrent jurisdiction with the Claims Court
over cases with amounts in controversy no greater than $10,000. Id.
215. Karahalios II, 544 F. Supp. at 79.
216. Warren, 764 F.2d at 1398.
217. Id.
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ject matter jurisdiction.2 18 The court reasoned that had the employee's
now-hybrid suit been brought under the private sector fair representation
model, his claim against the employer would have been founded on sec-
tion 301.219 Since, according to the court, Congress "considered and re-
jected a section 301 parallel" in the Civil Service Reform Act,220
Congress did not intend federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over such
claims. 221
The Ninth Circuit in Karahalios IV 222 also focused on Congress'
failure to include a section 301 clause in the Civil Service Reform Act, as
well as its failure to waive federal agency immunity, when it held that the
district court exercised no jurisdiction over the federal fair representation
suit.2 23 To the Karahalios IV court, Congress' omissions were deliber-
ate224 and evinced a legislative preference for keeping the interpretation
and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements within the arbitra-
tion process with the Federal Labor Relations Authority empowered to
review arbitration awards. 225 The court concluded that the failure to
grant specific jurisdiction to federal employees distinguished the federal
sector statute from the private sector statute and made federal sector fair
representation suits noncognizable. 226
Rather than focusing on a lack of the alleged "section 301 parallel,"
the court in Tucker focused on the overall structure of the Civil Service
Reform Act and the existence of alternative remedies available to federal
employees when it held that it had no jurisdiction over a federal em-
ployee's fair representation claim.227 The Tucker court found that the
Act provided two avenues for dispute resolution: (1) a federal employee
could file a grievance which, if unresolved, would go to binding arbitra-
tion with the arbitrator's award appealable to the Federal Labor Rela-
tions Authority; or (2) a federal employee could file an unfair labor
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. The court relied on Yates for the proposition that Congress rejected a § 301 clause. Id.
at 1397; see supra note 204.
221. Warren, 764 F.2d at 1399.
222. Karahalios IV, 821 F.2d 1389.
223. Id. at 1391.
224. Id. at 1392. The Karahalios IV court, in line with Yates and Warren, referred to the Con-
ference Committee's omission of § 7121(c). While the Karahalios IVcourt recognized that this pro-
vision did not deal directly with an employee's fair representation claim against her union, it
concluded that this omission showed Congress' intent to foreclose further access to the federal
courts. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1393.
227. For a discussion of the Tucker court's preemption analysis, see supra notes 195 to 201 and
accompanying text, and for discussion of the court's adverse consequences analysis, see infra notes
249 to 252 and accompanying text.
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practice with the Authority, with appeal of a final order taken to a
United States Court of Appeals. 228 According to the Tucker court, the
Act strictly limited the possible intervention of the federal district and
appellate courts. 229 The court concluded that the case provided a clear
example of the statutory construction canon that a "specific statement of
one path for federal jurisdiction patently implies that other roads are
blocked. '230 Since the Act specifically provided these two alternatives,
the Tucker court concluded, a third alternative via a fair representation
suit, which necessarily would have to be implied under the Act, was
foreclosed.
The court in Martel also focused on alternative remedies available to
federal employees and held that such remedies precluded the existence of
jurisdiction over federal fair representation suits in federal district
court. 231 The Martel court stated that the plaintiff was challenging the
propriety of his discharge through a fair representation claim. Congress
had specifically established the Merit Systems Protection Board, accord-
ing to the court, to hear unfair discharge challenges. 232 In addition, the
court stated the employee could file an unfair labor practice charge with
the Federal Labor Relations Authority. 233 The Martel court concluded
that because there was no explicit provision in the Civil Service Reform
Act conferring jurisdiction on the district courts to hear "allegations of
improper discharge or breach of duty," the court had no jurisdiction to
hear the employee's fair representation claim.234
C. Adverse Consequences Analysis
In addition to focusing on whether Vaca preemption applied in the
228. Tucker, 607 F. Supp. at 1238-39.
229. Id. The court cited commentary in the legislative history about the intended purpose of
§ 7702 to bolster its argument that Congress was attempting to limit district court jurisdiction. That
passage stated the following:
Currently employees who wish to challenge Commission decisions generally file their
claims with U.S. District Courts. The large number of these courts has caused wide varia-
tions in the kinds of decisions which have been issued on the same or similar matters. The
section remedies the problem by providing that Board decisions and orders... be review-
able by the Court of Claims and U.S. Court of Appeals, rather than U.S. District Courts.
It should be noted that this passage spoke to the appeals procedure from decisions of the Merit
Systems Protection Board, not from the Federal Labor Relations Authority. See Legislative His-
tory, supra note 3, at 2784-85.
230. Tucker, 607 F. Supp. at 1239.
231. The court also relied heavily on the adverse consequences analysis. For a discussion of the
court's reasoning, see infra notes 248 to 252 and accompanying text.
232. 562 F. Supp. at 445.
233. Id. The Martel court's description of the available remedies differs from the Tucker court's
determination. See supra notes 227 to 230 and accompanying text for discussion.
234. Id.
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federal sector, or determining whether the existence of specific jurisdic-
tion was important, courts also balanced the potential burdens on federal
labor/management relations against the potential benefits to federal em-
ployees. 235 One court struck the balance in favor of the employee by
arguing that the potential burdens of accepting jurisdiction were not that
significant. In addressing the claim that federal fair representation suits
would expose federal labor/management relations to unwelcome
nonuniformity, the court in Karahalios 11236 stated that "damages ac-
tions [in the private sector] are a recognized exception to the rule that
jurisdiction over labor disputes should be vested exclusively in a labor
board. ' 237 The court noted that federal courts had been applying fair
representation standards in the private sector for many years, and that
maximum consistency would actually be achieved if federal courts re-
tained jurisdiction over both private sector and federal sector fair repre-
sentation suits. 238 The Karahalios II court implied that in order to
achieve the desired uniformity, the Federal Labor Relations Authority
should be precluded from hearing any federal fair representation claims
brought as unfair labor practices, thus allowing the federal courts to de-
velop a consistent line of fair representation authority.
In contrast, courts denying jurisdiction over federal fair representa-
tion suits often found compelling reasons in the perceived conflicts such
recognition would cause. The Ninth Circuit, in its Karahalios IV 239 de-
cision, cited the disproportionate costs of federal fair representation suits
as justification when it overturned the district court's federal fair repre-
sentation award.24° The Karahalios IV court noted that when the Au-
thority entered into a settlement with Karahalios' union, the Authority
chose the prevention of future unfair labor practices over providing
Karahalios with personal relief.241 According to the court, the existence
of a separate remedy in federal district court "after investigation and is-
suance of a complaint by the General Counsel may lead to a tortuous
path of litigation whose costs are disproportionate to the individual bene-
235. Only one of the opinions that upheld federal fair representation jurisdiction analyzed the
potential problems from such recognition, while courts dismissing cases for lack of jurisdiction often
focused on the potential problems and justified their refusals to extend jurisdiction on the ground
that adverse consequences would arise. See infra notes 239 to 252 and accompanying text.
236. Karahalios II, 544 F. Supp. 77.
237. Id. at 80. The court also disagreed that the Authority would bring substantial expertise to
the area of federal fair representation issues. See id. at 80-81.
238. Id. at 80.
239. 821 F.2d 1389.
240. Id. at 1392.
241. Id.
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fit achieved. '242 The court added that the "protracted twists and turns
must be as disheartening to any eventual winner as they are to any even-
tual loser. '243 Thus, the Ninth Circuit raised both costliness and confu-
sion as potential consequences of federal fair representation suits.
The Martel court added inefficiency as another likely outcome if it
were to grant federal employees a right to litigate fair representation suits
in district courts. 2" The court stated that Congress intended to ensure
an efficient civil service system when it enacted the Civil Service Reform
Act.24 5 According to the court, the new system allowed an agency to
hire and fire federal employees more easily than the old system 246 and
this goal would be thwarted if an employee could litigate her unfair dis-
charge claim before the Merit Systems Protection Board, then pursue
unfair labor practice charges before the Federal Labor Relations Author-
ity, and then finally bring a fair representation suit in district court liti-
gating the same issue.247 Since the Civil Service Reform Act mandated
that its provisions be read in a manner consistent with the requirements
of an efficient government, the Martel court held that jurisdiction did not
attach to the employee's fair representation suit.248
Finally, the Tucker court focused on the potential conflict between
administrative and judicial fair representation decisions to support its re-
fusal to extend jurisdiction over federal fair representation suits. 249 The
Tucker court noted that Congress was sensitive to such problems and
drafted the Civil Service Reform Act to "minimize the risks of vagarious-
ness." 250 According to the court, Congress declined to incorporate a spe-
cific jurisdictional grant to allow federal fair representation suits solely
on the basis of this risk.251 Furthermore, the court stated, granting such
jurisdiction would create chaos and conflict and would "loom as a formi-
dable barrier to the speedy and efficacious accomplishment of the salu-
242. Id. The court's rationale is not entirely supported by the facts of the case. Karahalios
sought relief in federal district court because the General Counsel settled his claim against the union
and refused to issue a complaint against the agency. See Karahalios I, 534 F. Supp. at 1204 ("The
General Counsel directed the Regional Director to issue a complaint against the union, absent settle-
ment .... Plaintiff requested that the General Counsel review the settlement as to the union, and
reconsider the decision not to issue a complaint against [the agency].") (emphasis added).
243. Karahalios IV, 821 F.2d at 1392-93.
244. Martel, 562 F. Supp. at 445.
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2723).
247. Id.
248. Id. Section 7101(b) of the Civil Service Reform Act provides, in part, that "[t]he provisions
of this chapter should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the requirement of an effective and
efficient Government."
249. 607 F. Supp. at 1239.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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tary objectives of the Civil Service Reform Act."' 2 2 Thus, the court in
Tucker included both nonuniformity and inefficiency in its reasoning
when it declined jurisdiction to federal employees seeking relief from
breach of fair representation.
IV. ANALYSIS
Noticeably absent from the foregoing court decisions is an analysis
of arguably the most important question: When should a federal court
extend subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action that Congress
did not explicitly authorize in the legislation? Analysis of this question
centers on Cort v. Ash 253 and its progeny 2 4-an analysis that courts use
to determine the appropriate burdens a plaintiff must meet before federal
courts will recognize the plaintiff's implied cause of action. In Cort, the
Supreme Court held that before a court could imply a cause of action it
must weigh several factors: 1) whether the statute created a federal right
in the plaintiff; 2) whether there was any express or implied legislative
intent to support or deny the implication of a remedy; 3) whether impli-
cation was consistent with the purposes of the statute in question; and 4)
whether implication would inappropriately interfere with traditional
252. Id.
The court cited Martel for the proposition that a federal fair representation action was "unnec-
essary, counterproductive, and ultimately, unavailable." Id. at 1244. The Tucker court also stated
that the plaintiff's claims were classic illustrations of the "meddlesome and potentially disruptive
effect which the allowance of an independent cause of action . . . would pose." Id. The court was
referring to what it saw as the frivolous nature of the employees' claims: "When the orogeny which
pervades the plaintiffs' amended complaint is shorn of its rhetorical trappings, the little that remains
cannot withstand the rigors of the defendants' summary judgment initiatives ... [The employees] to
the extent (if at all) that they have been aggrieved ... have attempted to scale the wrong peak." Id.
at 1247.
253. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, plaintiff was a stockholder in the defendant-corporation and
brought suit to recover damages that he allegedly incurred when the corporate officers spent corpo-
rate funds to support a political campaign. Id. at 71. Petitioner sought to state a claim for relief
under a statute that provided criminal penalties, but no civil penalties. Id. The Supreme Court held,
in a unanimous decision, that implication of a private remedy was inappropriate under the statute in
question. Id. at 74.
254. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (denying an
implied cause of action under § 409(a) of ERISA); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (recognizing an implied cause of action for damages under the Com-
modity Exchange Act); Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (denying a
cause of action for contribution under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (denying an implied cause
of action for damages under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940); Touche Ross & Co. v. Reding-
ton, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (denying an implied cause of action under § 17 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (recognizing an implied cause of
action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972). See generally Hirshman, supra note
28 at 39-42; Note, Howard v. Pierce: Implied Causes of Action and the Ongoing Vitality of Cort v.
Ash, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 722, 734-44 (1985).
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state court jurisdiction. 255 Prior to Cort v. Ash, a much more liberal pe-
riod of implication existed, and it was during this less restrictive period
that the Court established the private sector duty of fair representation
model to which the courts have analogized. One commentator suggested
that "it is unclear whether the present Supreme Court would have
reached the same conclusion" with respect to implying a cause of action
for fair representation under the Railway Labor Act.25 6 Yet, the duty of
fair representation is deeply engrained in American labor law. This is
likely the reason that courts which addressed a federal sector duty of fair
representation simply assumed that applying Cort implication principles
was unnecessary.
In the end, however, the failure to invoke the Cort v. Ash analysis is
only of theoretical importance because the courts have largely addressed
the relevant Cort factors without identifying them as such. The courts
invariably relied on legislative intent and statutory purpose to decide the
federal fair representation issue without specifically purporting to ad-
dress Cort factors two and three. The courts did not address factors one
and four, but these two factors would have been met easily. The first
factor concerns whether the statute in question creates a federal right in
the plaintiff. The declared purpose of Title VII of the CSRA is "to pre-
scribe certain rights and obligations of the employees of the Federal Gov-
ernment and to establish procedures which are designed to meet the
special requirements and needs of the Government. ' 257 Title VII re-
quires labor organizations to "represent[ ] the interests of all employees
in the unit ... without discrimination and without regard to labor organ-
ization membership," 258 and permits aggrieved federal employees the
right to enforce this duty by filing unfair labor practice charges with the
FLRA.259 Clearly a federal employee is " 'one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted.' 260 The question facing the
courts was not whether the employee had a right to fair representation
but whether the FLRA was the sole forum in which to enforce the right.
Finally, the fourth Cort factor concerned whether implication of an im-
plied cause of action would interfere with traditional state court jurisdic-
255. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. Post-Cort decisions have focused primarily on the existence of legisla-
tive intent and have thereby narrowed the availability of implied causes of action. See Hirshman,
supra note 28, at 40-41; Note, supra note 254, at 732-33.
256. See Hirshman, supra note 28, at 70 n.350; but cf Communication Workers v. Beck, 108 S.
Ct. 2641 (1988).
257. 5 U.S.C. § 7101(b) (emphasis added).
258. Id. at § 7114(a)(1).
259. Id. at § 7116.
260. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (quoting Texas & P. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)) (emphasis
in original).
1988]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
tion. In light of the exclusively federal nature of the statute and rights in
question, this factor is irrelevant.
Thus, the courts have addressed relevant implication factors in their
opinions and have relied most heavily on the legislative history and con-
gressional intent of the CSRA as well as on the purpose of the statutory
scheme. These three factors, in fact, loosely parallel the analyses the
courts invoked to frame the issue of judicial recognition of the federal
duty of fair representation. The "Vaca preemption" analysis focuses pri-
marily on the legislative history of the CSRA and the importance of the
duty of fair representation clause in section 7114 of the statute. The
"specific jurisdiction" analysis focuses primarily on whether Congress in-
tended to permit federal fair representation suits when it passed the
CSRA or to preclude them through failing to provide a section 301-ana-
logue. Finally, the "adverse consequences" analysis focuses primarily on
whether the purposes of the CSRA would be compromised if courts rec-
ognized an implied cause of action for federal fair representation. It is to
the substance of these analyses that this Note now turns.
A. Vaca Preemption
Courts holding that jurisdiction attaches to federal fair representa-
tion suits found that the private and federal sectors are so similar in their
fundamental structures that it was appropriate to apply private sector
labor doctrines to similar federal labor issues. In Pham v. American Fed-
eration of Government Employees, Local 916,261 for example, the Tenth
Circuit held that federal employees shared the same fair representation
rights as private sector employees because the legislative history of the
Civil Service Reform Act demonstrated that Congress intended the fed-
eral sector to function similarly to the private sector.262 One indication
of this congressional intent, according to the Pham court, was that the
Civil Service Reform Act provided federal unions with the same exclu-
sive representation power that caused courts to infer jurisdiction over
private sector fair representation suits. 263
While it is true that both federal and private sector unions are guar-
anteed exclusive bargaining power when they are elected by a majority of
the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, one could argue that
significant differences exist in the relative strengths of their bargaining
power sufficient to distinguish application of private sector rules and doc-
261. 799 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1986).
262. Id. at 636-37 (quoting Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2828).
263. Id.
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trines to the federal sector. For example, federal unions are much more
limited in their power to bargain over terms and conditions of employ-
ment 264 and do not control the grievance and arbitration procedure to
the extent that most private sector unions do. This is said to be true
because federal employees may appeal certain adverse actions to the
Merit Systems Protection Board without the union's intervention.265 Be-
cause of these differences, it is argued, the federal sector union is not in as
strong a position to harm the federal employee as the private sector
union, and that therefore a fair representation remedy in federal court is
not as crucial to protect individual employee interests as it is in the pri-
vate sector. This reasoning, however, rests on questionable assumptions.
Federal unions seem to control the grievance and arbitration proce-
dure to the same extent that private sector unions do. Federal unions
and agencies, not federal employees, control whether to take a grievance
to arbitration and whether to appeal the eventual arbitration award. 266
Title VII itself gives federal unions power to control access to the arbitra-
tion process. 267 The argument that federal unions exercise less control or
power over the grievance and arbitration process than private sector un-
ions must be based, therefore, on the idea that federal employees have
additional safeguards beyond contract arbitration such as the right to
appeal agency actions to the MSPB.
As noted earlier, a federal employee may appeal certain adverse
agency actions to the Merit Systems Protection Board. 268 She may take
this appeal (assuming that she is not a probationary employee and that
she otherwise qualifies under MSPB procedures) regardless of her
union's evaluation of the underlying grievance. It could be argued that
this safeguard distinguishes the federal sector employee from her private
sector counterpart: she is able to "escape" her union's control in limited
circumstances where a private sector employee is unable to do so. This
argument may be valid for private sector unions governed by the NLRA.
Railway employees under the RLA, however, have the independent right
to "appeal" disputes to an adjudicative board-the NRAB.269 In fact,
railway employees may take any unresolved dispute to the NRAB and
there receive a hearing. 270 In contrast, some federal employees may ap-
264. See supra notes 91 to 96 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 98.
266. Only parties to the collective bargaining agreement may seek to arbitrate a grievance or
appeal an arbitration award. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7121(b)(3)(C) & 7122(a).
267. See 5 U.S.C. § 7121(b)(3)(C).
268. See supra note 98.
269. See 45 U.S.C. § 153 First(i) &(j).
270. Id.
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peal some agency actions to the MSPB. 271 The argument that federal
employees are better insulated from union power fails to account for the
true extent of federal union involvement in grievance and arbitration
processes and fails to distinguish the existence of similar safeguards avail-
able to some private sector employees.
Another similarity between private sector and federal sector labor
schemes that might justify recognition of federal fair representation suits
was offered in the Karahalios series. There, the district court emphasized
that because the NLRB focused on broad policy decisions to the detri-
ment of individual employee concerns, and because it had unreviewable
discretion to issue unfair labor practice complaints, federal jurisdiction
must exist to provide private employees with a forum to air their griev-
ances. 272 The Karahalios district court found the FLRA to be similarly
focused on institutional issues because it was modeled on the NLRB.273
It is reasonable to conclude that the FLRA focuses on broad federal
labor policies rather than individual employee concerns. The legislative
history of the Civil Service Reform Act demonstrates that the FLRA was
patterned in part after the NLRB. 2 7 4  The FLRA General Counsel,
whose duties and role were patterned after the NLRB General Counsel,
has unreviewable discretion to issue breach of fair representation com-
plaints. Countering NLRB discretion was an important factor in the
Supreme Court's rationale in Vaca v. Sipes.2 7 5
There are numerous situations where a federal employee's sole rem-
edy will be to file an unfair labor practice charge before the FLRA. This
271. Commentators have noted that federal employees fare poorly before the MSPB even when
they qualify for an appeal. The CSRA, and the Board's narrow interpretation of its mandate, "en-
sure[s] that the Board affords wide deference to agency personnel decisions," and, in fact, the MSPB
upholds agency decisions in 70% of the cases it hears. Developments, supra note 2, at 1638-39. The
resulting appeal procedure is thus "less than the ideal of independent judicial review." Brower,
supra note 114, at 385.
Federal employees may not have a higher success rate before arbitrators, however. While it
may be true that "[tihe formal, adversarial nature of the [MSPB] process stands in sharp contrast to
the negotiated procedures under the collective bargaining agreement," id., the Supreme Court held
that arbitrators must apply the same substantive standards that the MSPB would have applied had
the employee sought an appeal. Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648, 660 (1985). In Nutt, the Court
rejected the argument that contract arbitration differed so significantly from MSPB appeal proceed-
ings that different substantive standards should apply in each. Id. at 659. Thus, if it is true that the
MSPB is overly deferential to agency actions, it would appear that the federal employee is no better
off before an arbitrator.
272. Karahalios II, 544 F. Supp. 77, 81 (N.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 821 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2032 (1988).
273. See Karahalios I, 534 F. Supp. 1202, 1207-08 (N.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 821 F.2d 1389 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2032 (1988); Karahalios II, 544 F. Supp. at 81.
274. See supra text accompanying note 111.
275. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1967) ("The existence of even a small group of
cases in which the Board would be unwilling or unable to remedy a union's breach of duty would
frustrate the basic purposes underlying the duty of fair representation doctrine.").
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will occur, for example, when an employee is suspended for one week
and the union in bad faith denies her grievance. The employee cannot
appeal the agency's action on her own because it is ineligible for review
before the MSPB. 276 If the FLRA refuses to hear her unfair labor prac-
tice charge against the union (her sole recourse), she is without remedy.
Another example occurs when an employee is officially reprimanded for
misconduct and the union discriminates against the employee in refusing
to press her grievance. Reprimands do not meet the requirements of an
adverse action and thus do not qualify for MSPB appeal. The employee's
sole relief would come from the FLRA, and if the General Counsel re-
fuses to issue a complaint, the employee is without remedy. The General
Counsel of the FLRA determines in its unreviewable discretion whether
the duty of fair representation will be enforced in the federal sector, and
if so, how stringently the violators will be punished. Correcting compa-
rable NLRB discretion was one factor in the Vaca decision. Thus, to the
degree that the private sector fair representation suit is necessary to
counter NLRB discretion in the private sector, it is also necessary to
counter FLRA discretion in the federal sector.
Once courts that granted subject matter jurisdiction over federal fair
representation claims agreed that. private and federal labor relations were
analogous, they easily disposed of the argument that the Civil Service
Reform Act preempted independent federal fair representation suits.
The obvious private sector analogy for these courts was the Supreme
Court's decision in Vaca v. Sipes.2 7 7 The Supreme Court's decision in
Vaca was supported by a number of factors that are directly applicable in
the federal sector. As mentioned above, both models provide unreview-
able discretion to their respective labor boards.278  Also important to the
Vaca holding was that fair representation suits often involve matters
outside the labor board's unfair labor practice jurisdiction. 279  The
NLRB and the FLRA both have limited opportunity to "review the sub-
stantive positions taken and policies pursued by a union. '280
276. See supra note 98. If the issue could be raised under MSPB procedures, it would be fore-
closed from FLRA review. See 5 U.S.C. § 7116(d).
277. 386 U.S. 171. For a full discussion of Vaca v. Sipes, see supra notes 36 to 57 and accompa-
nying text.
278. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
279. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 181.
280. Id. The FLRA was patterned on the NLRB and both boards were given limited opportu-
nity to review bargaining and policy decisions unions make in the course of exercising their exclusive
bargaining powers. For example, the Act directs the FLRA to follow the private sector policy of
upholding arbitration awards except in very limited circumstances. See supra text accompanying
note 128. On the other hand, the FLRA is required to determine the "compelling need" for agency
rules and to resolve issues involving national consultation rights-two duties the NLRB does not
enforce. The resolution of consultation rights does not provide the FLRA with the opportunity to
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There are a number of distinctions between the federal and private
sector models, however, that could arguably make Vaca inapplicable. In
Vaca, the Supreme Court stated that the duty of fair representation in the
private sector "stood as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct
against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provi-
sions of federal labor law. ' 281 Presumably the Court was referring to the
employee's right individually to bargain with her employer when it re-
ferred to available forms of redress. It is questionable whether federal
employees were deprived of any "pre-existing right to contract" 282 with
their employer since historically federal employment has been by ap-
pointment only. 283 One could argue that this difference sufficiently dis-
tinguishes the private sector model from the federal sector model and
makes Vaca inapplicable. This analysis, however, fails to place the duty
of fair representation in its historical perspective. Private sector employ-
ees first joined labor unions to strengthen their bargaining power, to in-
stitute due process in their workplaces and generally to better their lot.284
In doing so, these private sector employees exchanged their "individual
right to contract" for the right to bargain collectively for rights and bene-
fits. What the private sector employees exchanged, however, was their
right to enter into employment-at-will contracts with employers who
could terminate them at any time for any reason.28 5 In this sense, non-
unionized federal sector employees are analogous to non-unionized pri-
vate sector employees: both have very limited bargaining power with
their employers and both unionize, in part, to seek the power and protec-
tion inherent in collectivity.
The federal government, through the Wagner Act, supported and
review substantive bargaining positions, and the resolution of "compelling need" disputes involves
determining whether the parties may bargain over a specific issue. See 5 U.S.C. § 7117. This latter
function is similar to the NLRB's determination whether an issue is a mandatory, permissive or
illegal subject of bargaining. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); see also A. Cox, D. BOK & R.
GORMAN, supra note 5, at 434-37.
281. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182; see also supra note 49.
282. One pre-existing right some federal employees have lost is the right to pursue actions for
back pay damages in the Claims Court under the Back Pay Act. See United States v. Fausto, 108 S.
Ct. 668 (1988).
283. It is debatable whether the notion of appointment-only federal employment survives in the
post-CSRA era. The idea that federal employees "serve at the pleasure of the sovereign" may have
been appropriate at one time in our history, but this idea contradicts the spirit of the legislative
history of the Civil Service Reform Act and seems ill-suited to a twentieth century governmental
bureaucracy that employs millions of workers. See Karahalios 1, 534 F. Supp. at 1209; see also
Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2724; Developments, supra note 2, at 1614-15.
284. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 5, at 14-15.
285. Id. "The growth of the large corporation diminished the bargaining power of the individual
worker to such an extent that talk of freedom of individual contract became an empty slogan." Id.
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promoted the cause of collective bargaining in the private sector. 286 Sim-
ilarly, the CSRA was intended to strengthen and promote collective bar-
gaining in the federal sector. 287 It was the growing realization in the
private sector that individual interests and union interests often contra-
dicted that led to both judicial and legislative reforms. 288 The judicially
inferred duty of fair representation was an integral part of this reform
and it is becoming increasingly clear that similar safeguards are required
in the federal sector.
A second distinction is apparent. The Supreme Court in Vaca cited
"practical considerations" 28 9 that are arguably inapplicable to the federal
sector. These practicalities involved the interplay between a private sec-
tor employee's breach of collective bargaining contract claim against the
employer and the employee's breach of fair representation claim against
the union. Under a private sector hybrid suit, the courts would have to
determine the extent of liability and damages for both the employer and
the union, and thus resolving the fair representation claim in a section
301 breach of contract case made sense. One could argue that federal
employees may not enforce their collective bargaining contracts in the
courts and that therefore these practicalities never arise. The practicali-
ties argument, however, rests on the unsupported assumption that the
Supreme Court only permitted hybrid fair representation actions instead
of individual fair representation actions against the union alone. In real-
ity, the Court specifically left the employee with the option whether to
pursue claims against the employer, the union or both.290
The feature that most distinguishes the CSRA from the NLRA or
RLA is the existence of a statutory duty of fair representation in the Act.
Some courts have held that the CSRA is devoid of a statutory duty of fair
representation. For example, the district court in Karahalios I held that
the Civil Service Reform Act itself did not contain any explicit duty of
fair representation, 29' apparently overlooking the clause in section 7114
that many courts consider to be the source of a federal duty of fair repre-
sentation. 292 The Tenth Circuit in Pham rejected the argument that the
Act contains an explicit duty of fair representation, and argued that the
286. Id. at 991.
287. See supra text accompanying note 89.
288. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 5, at 991-93.
289. See Vaca, 386 U.S. 183-87.
290. Id. at 187. The employee's claim in Vaca was solely against the union for breach of the
duty of fair representation. Id. at 173.
291. Karahalios I, 534 F. Supp. at 1207.
292. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 812 F.2d 1326 (1 1th Cir. 1986);
National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 800 F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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duty section 7114(a) imposes is merely a duty not to discriminate against
non-members of the bargaining unit. 293 The plain language of section
7114 requires the union to represent all of the employees in the unit
"without discrimination and without regard to labor organization mem-
bership. ' 294 The language of this provision is directed first to a "gen-
eral" type of discrimination and then to non-member discrimination.
The word discrimination can encompass a wide spectrum of meanings
and Congress did not define this term in the CSRA. It is thus difficult to
know if Congress intended to impose a duty on federal unions to refrain
from racial discrimination or a duty of fair representation as it has come
to be known in labor relations. Yet even if Congress intended section
7114(a) to impose on federal unions a full duty of fair representation,
there is no specific evidence that Congress intended the FLRA to be the
sole forum in which to adjudicate federal fair representation claims. By
specifically imposing the duty of fair representation on exclusive bargain-
ing representatives in the federal sector without simultaneously removing
the FLRA's discretion to enforce the duty, the CSRA fails to escape ap-
plication of the Vaca preemption analysis. Thus, even though the courts
in Pham and Karahalios may have been mistaken in their analyses of a
statutory duty of fair representation, their outcomes are still valid.295
In contrast to courts that accepted jurisdiction over federal fair rep-
resentation suits, courts that rejected the Vaca preemption analysis fo-
cused on congressional inclusion of section 7114(a) in the CSRA and the
alleged preclusive effect on federal fair representation jurisdiction this
provision creates. In Warren v. Local 1759, American Federation of Gov-
ernment Employees,296 the Eleventh Circuit held that fair representation
claims were the exclusive province of the FLRA because the Civil Ser-
vice Reform Act contains an explicit duty of fair representation at sec-
tion 7114(a) and the Authority was empowered to remedy breach of fair
representation under section 7116.297 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in
Karahalios IV 298 held that a duty of fair representation in section
293. Pham, 799 F.2d at 639; but cf American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 916 v. FLRA,
812 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1987) (Tenth Circuit holds that § 7114 imposes the same duty of fair
representation on federal unions as the courts have inferred on private sector unions).
294. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a) (emphasis added).
295. The Pham court based its decision to extend jurisdiction to federal fair representation suits
on a refusal to deny a federal employee her last remaining avenue of relief, and this rationale is
appropriate in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Vaca. Pham, 799 F.2d at 635. In a more
direct fashion, the Karahalios court concluded that the unreviewable discretion of the FLRA Gen-
eral Counsel required district courts to extend jurisdiction to federal fair representation claims.
Karahalios II, 544 F Supp. at 81.
296. 764 F.2d 1395 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985).
297. Id. at 1398-99.
298. 821 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2032 (1988).
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7114(a) of the Act precluded federal courts from recognizing a fair repre-
sentation suit.299 The statutory duty of fair representation argument,
however, fails to consider that enforcement of the duty is left to the dis-
cretion of the FLRA General Counsel. Thus, if a supervisor charges a
federal employee with insubordination, suspends her for a week, and the
union discriminatorily refuses to process her grievance because she sup-
ported the losing slate of candidates at the last union election, the em-
ployee's sole avenue of relief would be to file an unfair labor practice
charge before the Authority.30 If the FLRA General Counsel refused to
issue a complaint, the employee would be left with no forum unless a
federal fair representation action could be brought in federal court.
The statutory fair representation argument is also weakened by evi-
dence that the General Counsel of the FLRA, in the exercise of its dis-
cretion, does not in fact vigorously enforce the duty of fair representation
in the federal sector.301 The Ninth Circuit in Karahalios IV was con-
fronted with FLRA statistics which demonstrated that during 1986 only
14% of the unfair labor practice charges against unions brought to the
Authority resulted in complaints.30 2 Roughly half of the charges were
dismissed, while the others were withdrawn or settled.30 3 The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that these statistics were "open to interpretation." The
court's treatment of this evidence was not faithful to the Supreme Court's-
statement in Vaca that even a small number of private sector complaints
which the NLRB General Counsel dismissed would frustrate the purpose
of the fair representation doctrine.3°4 Even if the Ninth Circuit had been
faced with FLRA statistics which counterfactually demonstrated that
14% of unfair labor practice charges against unions were being dismissed
rather than accepted, the court should still have recognized that the Gen-
eral Counsel was exercising considerable discretion in the prosecution of
unfair labor practices.
299. Id. at 1392.
300. The employee could not appeal the agency decision to the MSPB. "Adverse actions" under
the Merit Systems Protection Board procedures do not include suspensions of less than 14 days. 5
U.S.C. § 7512. See also supra note 98.
301. See, e.g., Broida, supra note 92, cited in Warren, 764 F.2d at 1399 n.6, and Karahalios IV,
821 F.2d at 1392; and FLRA, Report on Case Handling Developments of the Office of the General
Counsel, FLRA Doc. 1335 (Feb. 1987), cited in Karahalios IV, 821 F.2d at 1392.
While there is some question whether the Broida evidence alone sufficiently alleged lax enforce-
ment, the Warren court's offhand treatment of the evidence was undeserved. The court stated that,
in view of the numerous FLRA fair representation cases cited in the agency's brief, it was unper-
suaded that the FLRA lacked zeal in prosecuting fair representation complaints. Id. Not only did
the court disregard the possibility that the FLRAfailed to issue complaints on "numerous" other
fair representation charges, it also minimized the actual evidence the employee presented.
302. Karahalios IV, 821 F.2d at 1392.
303. Id.
304. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182-83.
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While not explicitly mentioning section 7114(a) and the duty it im-
poses, the court in Tucker v. Defense Mapping Agency 30 5 argued that the
general structure of the Civil Service Reform Act preempted federal
court jurisdiction. The court in Tucker recognized that the Act did not
specifically call for preemption of federal court suits, but held that Con-
gress intended the Act to be the primary mode for vindicating employee
rights in the federal sector.30 6 The court's argument, however, showed a
misunderstanding of Federal Labor Relations Authority procedure. The
Tucker court reasoned that federal employees did not need access to fed-
eral court because they could bring their fair representation claims as
unfair labor practice charges before the Authority. 30 7 While this avenue
is available to the federal employee, the Authority decides, in its sole
discretion, whether it will adjudicate the employee's fair representation
claim. Countering this administrative discretion was one of the reasons
the Supreme Court held in Vaca that federal court jurisdiction exists for
,private sector fair representation suits. Thus, the argument that federal
employees can bring their fair representation claims to the Authority
fails to address the problem of the FLRA General Counsel's administra-
tive discretion.
Finally, the court in Martel v. Carroll308 stated that a discharged
federal employee could appeal a discharge to the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board despite the union's evaluation of the employee's claim while
private sector employees had to rely on their unions to press a grievance.
The court concluded that private sector employees, because of this reli-
ance, had recourse through a fair representation suit should the union
discriminate against them in handling the grievance. 309 The Martel court
failed to recognize two points in its analysis. First, the Merit Systems
Protection Board hears appeals only from specific groups of federal em-
ployees, and these appeals are limited to discharges, extended dismissals
and other "serious" agency actions.310 Even assuming the employee has
the proper status to appeal, she may not appeal reprimands, shorter sus-
pensions, and other "less serious" agency actions.
The Martel court also failed to recognize that employees under the
private sector Railway Labor Act may bring their own grievances to an
adjudicative board without relying on their union.31 1 Yet, the ability of
305. 607 F. Supp. 1232 (D.R.I. 1985).
306. Id. at 1239.
307. Id. at 1245.
308. 562 F. Supp. 443 (D. Mass. 1983).
309. Id. at 445.
310. See supra note 98 for a discussion of MSPB procedures.
311. See supra note 107.
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employees under the Railway Labor Act to pursue their own grievances
affects only the apportionment of damages in a fair representation suit,
not the court's jurisdiction to hear the fair representation claims.3' 2 As
the Supreme Court explained in Bowen v. United States Postal Service,
"[e]ven though the [railway] employees had a right to seek full redress
from an administrative board, the union still had a duty to represent
them fairly."' 313 Federal unions owe their employees a duty of fair repre-
sentation despite the statutory right to pursue certain "adverse actions"
before the Merit Systems Protection Board. In addressing only the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act procedures, the Martel court's analysis did
not adequately distinguish the private sector Railway Labor Act which
also permits individual employees to pursue their own grievances.
B. Specific Jurisdiction Analysis
When considering how important it was that Congress failed to in-
clude a specific jurisdictional grant in the Civil Service Reform Act to
enable federal employees to bring fair representation suits in federal
court, the courts on both sides of the issue seem especially prone to read-
ing congressional intent expansively and to constructing weak inferences
attributable to that intent. In Pham, the court upheld jurisdiction over a
federal fair representation suit against a union despite the absence of a
specific jurisdictional grant in the CSRA. 314 The Pham court reasoned
that Congress failed to include a specific jurisdictional grant to allow
suits for breach of the collective bargaining contract against the employer
because Congress did not want to waive the federal agency's sovereign
immunity. 315 Since there were no immunity problems with federal un-
ions, the court reasoned, general federal question jurisdiction would sup-
port the claim against the union. 316 This reasoning finds no support in
the legislative history of the Act. Congress apparently did not consider
the duty of fair representation at all, let alone the different jurisdictional
foundations for hybrid claims. The suit before the Pham court involved
only a federal employee's claim against her union. Thus, it is likely the
court did not fully investigate whether jurisdiction already existed for an
312. See supra notes 64 to 76 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's first duty of fair
representation case, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 323 U.S. 192 (1944), involved a case
brought under the Railway Labor Act. See supra notes 20 to 23 and accompanying text.
313. 459 U.S. at 212, 229 (1983).
314. 799 F.2d 634.
315. Id. at 639. Without elaborating, the court stated that there were reasons why Congress
would want private sector employees to be able to sue their employers for breach of the collective
bargaining contract but would not want the same ability extended to federal employees. Id.
316. Id.
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aggrieved party to bring an action for breach of contract against the fed-
eral government. This investigation was taken up in the Karahalios dis-
trict court opinions, however.
In Karahalios 11,317 the court reasoned that a specific jurisdictional
grant was unnecessary since the employee already had jurisdiction to
bring suit against the union under section 1331 and against the federal
agency under section 1346.318 The Karahalios H court's reasoning is
more consistent with the idea that Congress did not consider the issue of
jurisdiction over federal fair representation suits. The court, however,
implied that Congress considered and rejected the idea of including fair
representation jurisdiction in the Act 319 and there is no clear support for
this proposition.
If one were to choose the easiest case for finding congressional intent
to hear breach of fair representation claims in federal court, it would be
the case in which Congress included a section 301-like clause in the
CSRA. Opponents of federal court jurisdiction contend that Congress
considered and rejected a general jurisdiction clause "similar to section
301," which would have permitted breach of contract claims against fed-
eral agencies to be heard in district courts. 320 The clause cited for this
proposition, however, was section 7121(c) of the House version of the
Bill which would have permitted either the union or the agency to seek
an injunction in federal district court to force the other party to arbitra-
tion. 321 The district court in Karahalios II argued that the deletion of an
injunctive relief provision did not indicate congressional intent to fore-
close damages relief in the federal courts for breach of the duty of fair
representation.3 22 The differentiation of the type of relief a plaintiff
would seek, however, does not seem sound. The court could have criti-
cized on more solid ground the inference to be drawn from Congress'
deletion: the deleted House provision was nothing like section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act. Where section 301 granted federal
courts broad jurisdiction over breach of collective bargaining agreement
actions, proposed section 7121(c) was strictly limited to providing a
party with the power to force the other party to arbitration. The Confer-
ence Committee decided that questions of arbitrability should be handled
by the Federal Labor Relations Authority, and thus the clause was
317. 544 F. Supp. 77.
318. Id. at 79-80.
319. Id.
320. See supra notes 220 to 226 and accompanying text.
321. See Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2891.
322. Karahalios II, 544 F. Supp. at 80.
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stricken. 32
3
The section 7121 (c) argument also fails to differentiate among com-
peting interests. Section 712 1(c) was a jurisdictional clause directed to-
ward institutional interests, not individual interests. It was designed to
allow either a union or an agency (not an employee) to force the other
party to arbitrate a dispute. 324 Fair representation jurisdiction, on the
other hand, empowers individual interests: it would allow individual em-
ployees to protect themselves against arbitrary, discriminatory or bad-
faith treatment. The most likely reason Congress failed specifically to
empower federal employees with a judicially enforceable duty of fair rep-
resentation is that the individual interests of federal employees were not
represented in the legislative process that led to the enactment of the
CSRA. Institutional interests, of course, were represented through all
stages of the process. 325 This being the case, one would be surprised to
find unions and agencies proposing jurisdictional clauses that would ex-
pose them to fair representation liability. 326 One should not be surprised
that they did not include such a clause.
The fact remains, however, that Congress did not provide specific
fair representation jurisdiction. The question thus becomes whether this
omission matters-whether Congress thereby intended to foreclose any
rights or remedies enforceable in federal court. Since the private sector
hybrid fair representation suit is based in part on section 301 and the
federal model would necessarily differ, the Karahalios court analyzed the
proper jurisdictional grounds on which hybrid federal fair representation
suits could be based. Karahalios' action was a typical hybrid fair repre-
sentation claim involving both a breach of fair representation claim
against the union that could be based on section 1331 federal question
jurisdiction and a breach of contract claim against the federal agency
that could be based on section 1346.327 If the breach of contract claim
involved over $10,000, as Karahalios' apparently did, the suit must be
brought in the Claims Court. The Karahalios court recognized that
323. Id. In general, intervention of the federal courts under the Senate version of the Bill was
more limited than the House version. The Senate version only permitted court review of FLRA
decisions concerning unfair labor practices, with all other decisions final and conclusive. See Legis-
lative History, supra note 3, at 2887. The House version, however, permitted the FLRA to petition a
court of appeals to enforce an order and to petition a district court to enjoin a party from continuing
unfair labor practices. Id. at 2886. The final version of the CSRA included these House version
provisions. Id. One could read this history as evincing congressional intent to increase the overall
role of the federal judiciary in federal labor/management relations rather than limit to it.
324. Under the final version of § 7121, either party may invoke arbitration, but neither party can
force the other to do so. See 5 U.S.C. § 7121.
325. See Brower, supra note 114, at 370 n.76; see generally Cooper & Bauer, supra note 77.
326. Brower, supra note 114, at 370 n.76.
327. Karahalios I, 534 F. Supp. at 1209 n.6.
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under this scheme the federal employee would have to pursue his claim
against the agency and the union in two different forums since neither
party could be properly joined in the other's suit. Karahalios apparently
expressed fear that his ultimate damage award would be fragmented by
pursuing the two claims separately, but the district court recommended
that Karahalios bring suit solely against the agency since unions were
rarely assessed large damage awards in fair representation suits. 328
The court's recommendation in Karahalios II to bring suit solely
against the agency came the year before the Supreme Court held in
Bowen v. United States Postal Service that unions were required to share
proportionately in damage awards to the extent of their wrongdoing.3 29
The Court's decision in Bowen, however, would not directly control dam-
ages apportionment in federal fair representation suits. A federal agency
involved in a hybrid fair representation suit would attempt to analogize
to Bowen and argue that federal unions should be liable for any damages
the unions' breach of fair representation caused the employee. Federal
unions, however, could counter that the "additional expense" formula
the Supreme Court approved in Czosek v. O'Mara330 would apply since,
like the railway employees in Czosek, federal employees can appeal ad-
verse agency actions regardless of the union's evaluation of the claim.
Thus, if the federal union breached its duty of fair representation in han-
dling the employee's grievance, the federal union would argue, the em-
ployee should only recover from the union the additional expenses she
incurred in later pursuing an MSPB appeal.
Of course, there is an obvious distinction to be drawn between the
federal labor scheme and the labor scheme under the Railway Labor Act
in terms of an employee's ability individually to appeal an employer's
action. The federal scheme limits individual employee appeals of agency
action to relatively serious matters while the Railway Labor Act permits
employees to "appeal" any unresolved dispute with their employer.3 31 If
the federal employee did not have a right to appeal a particular agency
action, she would have to rely solely on the union to represent her in the
negotiated grievance and arbitration process. But if the federal em-
ployee's grievance was one which she was permitted to pursue alone
before the MSPB, her union's breach of fair representation in failing to
process this MSPB appeal (which it could undertake voluntarily) or its
328. Karahalios II, 544 F. Supp. at 78.
329. 459 U.S. 212 (1983). See supra notes 68 to 76 and accompanying text for discussion of the
Bowen decision.
330. 397 U.S. 25 (1970). See supra notes 64 to 67 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 107.
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bad-faith failure to process the underlying grievance (for which it would
likely be solely responsible) would not completely bar the employee's her
remedy: qualified MSPB appeals may be taken without the union's inter-
vention. Provided the union's breach did not completely bar the em-
ployee's MSPB remedy, the union would only be liable for the additional
expenses the employee incurred in winning her eventual award. In this
context, the district court's advice in Karahalios II has retained its valid-
ity despite the intervention of the Bowen decision. If, however, the
agency's action against the employee did not meet the requirements of an
"adverse action," the employee would be unable to pursue her own ap-
peal before the MSPB. In this case, the federal union would be analo-
gous to a union under the National Labor Relations Act which exercises
greater control over the employee's grievance. In this situation, the
Czosek rationale could be distinguished on the ground that the union's
action did in fact completely bar the employee's recovery. Under this
scenario, the Supreme Court's rationale in Bowen would control and the
union would be liable for a larger damage award.
As the Karahalios II court noted, a federal employee's breach of
collective bargaining contract claim in excess of $10,000 must be brought
in the Claims Court under section 1346.332 Should the breach of con-
tract claim against the agency be $10,000 or less, however, a hybrid suit
against both the agency and the unions could be brought in federal dis-
trict court. If the federal employee sought to recover solely from the
union, suit would be brought under section 1331 in a federal district
court. Thus, notwithstanding the lack of specific jurisdiction in the Civil
Service Reform Act, jurisdiction "exists" to support a federal duty of fair
representation suit in federal district court or the Court of Claims.
Courts that denied jurisdiction over federal fair representation
under the specific jurisdiction analysis either relied on the fact that Con-
gress did not expressly include a jurisdictional clause or pointed to Con-
gress' deletion of the injunctive relief clause to reach their conclusions
that jurisdiction did not exist. 333 The Eleventh Circuit introduced an
additional component in its analysis in Warren. Despite the fact that the
federal employee in Warren named only the union in her fair representa-
332. 544 F. Supp. at 78.
333. Both the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits held that Congress' deletion of proposed § 7121(c) of
the House version of the Bill evinced congressional intent to foreclose jurisdiction in federal fair
representation claims. In Warren, the Eleventh Circuit pointed to the omission of § 7121(c) of the
House version of the Bill, which it called "a § 301 parallel," to demonstrate congressional intent to
restrict federal fair representation suits. 764 F.2d at 1398. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in
Karahalios IV stated that Congress' deliberate omission of § 7121(c) evinced an intent to close off
further access to federal courts. 821 F.2d at 1392.
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tion complaint, the court held that an underlying claim existed for
breach of contract against her employer.134 If the employee had been a
private sector employee, the Warren court reasoned, her now-hybrid suit
would be founded on both section 1331 and section 301. Since the Civil
Service Reform Act did not contain a section 301 provision, the court
continued, the employee was barred from bringing her fair representation
claim. 335 The Warren court's analysis failed to consider two important
points.
First, Congress did not amend the Railway Labor Act to include a
section 301 jurisdiction clause allowing an employee to sue her employer
for breach of the collective bargaining contract, and despite this omis-
sion, the courts still permit railway employees to enforce the duty of fair
representation in court. The railway employee's entire hybrid suit is
based solely on section 1331 federal question jurisdiction.3 36 This is true
notwithstanding the clear congressional intent in the Railway Labor Act
to channel contractual interpretation and enforcement claims to the Na-
tional Railway Adjustment Board. 337 Granted, federal court jurisdiction
over railway fair representation claims is recognized as a limited and nar-
row exception to the Railway Labor Act,338 but the exception exists. The
court's analysis failed to account for all private sector fair representation
jurisdictional schemes. Second, the Warren court assumed that an em-
ployee could only bring a hybrid fair representation claim, rather than a
fair representation suit solely against the union. This assumption finds
no support in the case law. 339
Courts that focused on the specific jurisdictional grant argument
also misconstrued the procedural requirements of the Civil Service Re-
form Act. The Ninth Circuit held in Karahalios IV that the lack of spe-
cific jurisdiction in the CSRA revealed congressional intent to keep the
interpretation and enforcement of federal collective bargaining contracts
334. Warren, 764 F.2d at 1398.
335. Id.
336. As the Sixth Circuit held in the context of a railway employee's breach of contract claim
against the employer, a collective bargaining contract creates "legally enforceable obligations en-
forceable by whatever means appropriate." Kaschak v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 707 F.2d 902, 909
n. 13 (6th Cir. 1983). Failure to extend subject matter jurisdiction over the claim would be, accord-
ing to the court, "tantamount to a denial of the right to be a party to a legally enforceable collective
bargaining agreement." Id. at 910. See also supra note 28.
It is clear that a federal employee's entire fair representation suit could not be based solely on
federal question jurisdiction. Since the employer is a governmental entity, immunity problems
would have to be overcome. Under § 1346, however, a party can litigate a breach of contract claim
against the federal government in the Court of Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
337. See supra note 28.
338. See M. MALIN, supra note 23, at 426.
339. See supra text accompanying note 290.
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within the arbitration process. 340 This analysis failed to recognize that
the union and the employer exercise considerable control over the griev-
ance and arbitration process in the federal sector. 341  If an employee's
grievance is unsatisfactorily settled, only the union or the employer can
invoke binding arbitration342 and this is an unlikely occurrence in a typi-
cal breach of representation/breach of contract action. In addition, only
the parties to the arbitration can appeal the arbitration award to the
Court of Appeals; an individual employee is not party to, and therefore
not able to appeal, an arbitrator's award.343
Likewise misconstruing the procedural requirements of the Act, the
district court in Tucker indicated that two avenues of relief were avail-
able to the aggrieved federal employee: (1) she could file a grievance that
would proceed to binding arbitration, or (2) she could file an unfair labor
practice charge before the Federal Labor Relations Authority. 344 The
court's first suggestion overestimates the limited role the employee plays
in the arbitration process, and the court's second suggestion fails to con-
sider the role of the FLRA General Counsel's discretion in the unfair
labor practice proceeding. 345
The district court in Martel also reasoned that alternative remedies
within the CSRA rebutted the argument that fair representation jurisdic-
tion was necessary to provide a forum for aggrieved federal employees.
The court noted that federal employees had two alternative remedies that
were available in lieu of access to federal courts, but the alternatives dif-
340. Karahalios IV, 821 F.2d at 1392.
341. See 5 U.S.C. § 7121(b)(3)(C) ("[A]ny grievance not satisfactorily settled under the negoti-
ated grievance procedure shall be subject to binding arbitration which may be invoked by either the
exclusive representative or the agency.") (emphasis added).
342. Id.
343. Id. at § 7122(a).
344. Tucker, 607 F. Supp. at 1238-39.
345. The Tucker court also cited a passage in the legislative history of the Civil Service Reform
Act which indicated that Congress intended to limit the role of the district courts in hearing appeals
of Merit System Protection Board orders and that this limitation indicated a general congressional
intent to limit any district court involvement in the federal sector. Id. at 1239. See Legislative
History, supra note 3, at 2784-85.
In general, the language the court in Tucker referred to dealt with the problem of unpredictable
application of administrative rules by the various district courts. Congress restricted the district
court's ability to review administrative decisions and left this task to the Courts of Appeals. This
congressional action indicates that Congress continued to believe that an avenue of appeal was im-
portant, otherwise it would have restricted any review of Merit System Protection Board decisions
rather than shifting the review responsibilities from one court to another. One could imply from this
interpretation that federal court jurisdiction should exist to allow those federal employees subject to
unreviewable discretion a forum to adjudicate their claims; this would effectuate the overall congres-
sional intent of the statute. The action also suggests, however, that Congress was concerned with the
uniformity of administrative rules. As noted earlier, private sector fair representation standards are
anything but uniform, see supra notes 61 to 63, and recognizing a private cause of action may not
achieve the goal of creating a perfectly uniform federal labor/management system.
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fered from those the Tucker court found. The Martel court suggested:
(1) that the employee could take her unfair discharge action to the Merit
Systems Protection Board, or (2) the employee could file an unfair labor
practice charge with the Federal Labor Relations Authority. 346
Although the employee could file an appeal with the Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board without relying on her union, the court did not address the
possibilities that (1) the employee in fact relied on her union to file the
claim with the Board, or that (2) the adverse action did not qualify for
MSPB review. If the union breached its duty of fair representation with
respect to the MSPB claim, or if the action were not reviewable, the em-
ployee would not have recourse to a fair representation suit in order to
redress her claim.
The Martel court's second suggestion was that the federal employee
could file an unfair labor practice charge with the Federal Labor Rela-
tions Authority. This suggestion fails to consider the possibility that the
FLRA General Counsel would decline to issue a fair representation com-
plaint and thereby leave the employee without remedy. The district
courts in both Tucker and Martel attempted to confine the federal em-
ployee to a procedure within the Civil Service Reform Act that would
permit recovery for breach of the duty of fair representation. This at-
tempt must accurately incorporate the limited procedures Congress built
into the Act. While appearing comprehensive, the Civil Service Reform
Act failed to address the fair representation issue and thus failed to pro-
vide a much-needed safeguard against the potential abuse of power by
institutional interests.
In sum, courts that denied jurisdiction over federal fair representa-
tion suits by focusing on the omission of a section 301 clause failed to
explain the similar lack of a section 301 clause in the Railway Labor Act.
This lack of specific jurisdiction did not prevent the courts from ex-
tending jurisdiction over fair representation claims under that statute and
it should not prevent courts from extending jurisdiction over federal fair
representation suits brought under the Civil Service Reform Act. While
courts may not infer federal question jurisdiction over federal agency
breach of collective bargaining contract claims, this should not prevent
fair representation suits under sections 1346 or 1491, or suits solely
against the union under section 1331. Since a federal employee's options
under the Act are limited, an independent fair representation action in
federal district court or the Claims Court is necessary to protect individ-
346. Martel, 562 F. Supp. at 445.
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ual employees who may be subject to discriminatory treatment by their
unions without being able to redress their claims elsewhere.
C. Adverse Consequences Analysis
Courts that granted jurisdiction over federal fair representation suits
did not generally address the argument that such suits would cause ad-
verse consequences for federal labor-management relations. It is unclear
whether this was an oversight or whether the courts found such argu-
ments so unpersuasive as to be unworthy of discussion. In Karahalios II,
the court dismissed the argument that independent fair representation
suits would cause unwelcome nonuniformity. 347 The court noted that
federal courts have been applying private sector fair representation stan-
dards for over forty years. 348 Since the courts were therefore better
equipped to adjudicate fair representation suits, the court reasoned, max-
imum consistency would be reached by allowing federal courts to decide
both private sector and federal sector fair representation suits. 349
The Karahalios II court's emphasis on uniformity is well placed.
Uniform federal labor/management regulations was one of the primary
purposes of the Civil Service Reform Act. 350 The concern over the con-
flicting standards of union conduct courts apply in private sector fair
representation cases may have been an unspoken motivating factor in
dismissing federal fair representation suits. Potentially conflicting stan-
dards for union conduct, however, should not bar jurisdiction over fed-
eral employee fair representation suits. While there is much debate over
the proper standard to be applied in private sector fair representation
suits, 35 I no one advocates revoking federal court jurisdiction over private
sector fair representation suits and requiring private sector employees to
file unfair labor practice charges with the General Counsel of the
NLRB. 35 2
Besides the possible concern over conflicting standards of fair repre-
sentation in the private sector, courts deny jurisdiction over federal fair
representation suits because of what they see as sure and immediate ad-
verse consequences. Once again, however, the courts misconstrue the
procedural regulations of the Act and forecast unlikely outcomes. For
347. Karahalios II, 544 F. Supp. 77.
348. Id. at 80.
349. Id.
350. See Legislative History, supra note 3, at 2725-26, 2732, 2734; see also United States v.
Fausto, 108 S. Ct. 668, 671 (1988).
351. See supra notes 61 to 63.
352. Cf Graf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 697 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1983) (questioning the proper jurisdic-
tional grounds for a hybrid duty of fair representation suit under the Railway Labor Act).
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example, the Ninth Circuit in Karahalios IV reasoned that the existence
of a remedy in federal court after the Federal Labor Relations Authority
investigated and issued a complaint might lead to a "tortuous path of
litigation whose costs are disproportionate to the individual benefit
achieved. '3 53 Yet, if the Authority issued an unfair labor practice com-
plaint, the employee who wanted to appeal an unsatisfactory adjudica-
tion of the complaint would do so by appealing this "final order" of the
Authority to a United States Court of Appeals under section 7123(a) of
the Act.354 Failure to issue a complaint is not a final order appealable to
any court. 35 5 If the federal employee attempted to relitigate the same
issues she had already litigated before the Authority, or if she otherwise
failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Title VII (for ex-
ample, by appealing the Authority's final order to a district court instead
of a court of appeals), a federal court could dismiss the action and re-
quire the employee to follow Title VII's procedural mandates. Con-
versely, where Title VII leaves individual employees unprotected, the
federal courts should provide aggrieved federal employees with a forum.
The court in Martel similarly misconstrued Title VII's procedures
when it held that the Act's goal of a more efficient system of hiring and
firing would be thwarted if an employee could litigate her grievance
before the Merit Systems Protection Board, then bring an unfair labor
practice charge before the Federal Labor Relations Authority, and then
bring an action to the federal district court for breach of fair representa-
tion.356 The Act specifically provides for appeals of MSPB decisions and
FLRA final orders; the Act would therefore require an employee who
received an appealable order from either source to seek review in a
United States Court of Appeals. Thus, the CSRA already provides statu-
tory safeguards to prevent an employee from relitigating the same claim
in a different forum.
If a federal employee had contractual or administrative remedies
available, she, like her private sector counterpart, would have to attempt
to exhaust those remedies. 357 The Supreme Court acknowledged this ex-
haustion requirement in Vaca when it stated that the employee must at
353. Karahalios IV, 821 F.2d at 1392.
354. See 5 U.S.C. § 7123.
355. See supra note 134; see also Turgeon v. FLRA, 677 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Wilson v.
United States, 585 F. Supp. 202 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
356. 562 F. Supp. at 445. A federal employee could not possibly appeal an agency action to the
MSPB and then bring an unfair labor practice charge to the FLRA on the same incident. Title VII
specifically requires the employee to choose one method or the other. See 5 U.S.C. § 7116.
357. The private sector exhaustion principle is grounded in the general national policy favoring
private, nonjudicial resolutions of labor conflicts. See M. MALIN, supra note 23, at 442. The re-
quirement of exhausting internal union remedies is not absolute, and the Supreme Court has recog-
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least attempt to exhaust the grievance procedures established in the col-
lective bargaining contract. 358 The federal courts have established ex-
haustion requirements in the private sector fair representation cases that
could easily be applied to the federal sector. 359 Thus, the fear of a return
to the days of the "unfireable federal employee" who can manipulate the
system and unduly delay her proper discharge is unsupported.
In sum, the adverse consequences analysis fails because it relies on
assumptions which can be avoided by adherence to the procedural ave-
nues delineated in the Act. In addition, courts can employ the exhaus-
tion principles that they have developed in private sector fair
representation suits to avoid many of the predicted outcomes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The duty of fair representation serves an important role in protect-
ing individual rights within the context of private sector labor/manage-
ment relations. Since the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, however, its role in federal sector labor/management relations has
remained unclear. Despite the existence of certain statutory protections
available to federal employees, narrow application of these safeguards
and increased federal sector fair representation litigation demonstrate
that these statutory protections are inadequate in many circumstances.
Aggrieved federal employees are increasingly turning to federal courts to
seek redress for injuries suffered when their agency breaches its collective
bargaining contract and their union fails properly to handle their griev-
ance. Federal district courts, however, are largely denying access to
these employees.
As demonstrated in this Note, the courts' rationales for denying
subject matter jurisdiction over federal fair representation suits are not
entirely sound. While the private sector model provides a logical analogy
for federal sector suits, courts attempt to distinguish this model using
various analyses. It is clear, however, that Congress gave the Federal
Labor Relations Authority unreviewable discretion in its decisions to en-
force the duty of fair representation pursuant to its unfair labor practice
jurisdiction. This congressional action requires cc-.rts to reconcile the
Authority's unreviewable administrative discretion with the resulting
nized three general exceptions to the exhaustion rule: inability to obtain complete relief, futility, and
excessive delay. Id.
358. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 184.
359. It seems reasonable to require federal employees to exhaust available statutory grievance
procedures in order to effectuate the intent of the statute.
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problem of the individual aggrieved employee who is denied access to
any forums in which to seek a remedy for her wrongs.
A few courts have noted that existing civil procedure laws provide
the jurisdictional basis necessary to address the merits of federal employ-
ees' fair representation suits. These courts recognize and attempt to ad-
dress the problem of individual rights in the context of statutory and
administrative focus on the institutional concerns of management and
labor. While it can be argued that the existence of such suits introduces
the potential for conflicting judicial interpretation, the balance should be
struck in favor of individual interests when the potential for institutional
abuse is unguarded.
